


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23 MARCH 1989



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USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 11, November 1988

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USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology

No 11, November 1988

Recent American Research on Voter Behavior Surveyed

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[Article by Viktor Ivanovich Borisjuk, candidate of historical sciences and sector chief at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, and Tatyana Vladimirovna Galkova, candidate of historical sciences and junior scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "The American Voter in the Mirror of Political Science"; words in boldface as published]

[Text] Long before the election this November, American newspapers and magazines—scientific publications intended for specialists in limited fields and publications intended for the general public—began summing up the results of Reagan's 8 years in office. The authors of the many articles, analytical surveys, and monographs which constitute something like a "political necrology" of the era, are inclined to agree that the outgoing administration is leaving many unresolved problems and unanswered questions behind.

One of the most frequently discussed topics does not seem at first to have any direct connection with the daily activities of the administration but has nevertheless been traditionally regarded as one of the indirect political results of these activities: the tendencies and dynamics of the evolution of the American parties' mass base.

It is a well-known fact that all of the Reagan group's efforts to mobilize the masses around the "Grand Old Party" did not secure any substantial influx of new forces. The hopes K. Phillips voiced in his best-selling book¹ for a long "Republican era" and for the stabilization of the American two-party system on the basis of new political principles were not fulfilled. During the Republicans' 16 years in office (1969-1989, excluding Carter's 4-year term in 1977-1981), they were unable to become the "majority party."²

This is why the problems of 10 or 20 years ago have become crucial issues again on the threshold of the 1990's. What are the causes and nature of the decline of the American parties and the two-party system as a whole? What is the reason for the continuing politicization of the masses in the United States outside the framework of the leading parties and the continuous increase in the number of "independent" voters? What causes the formation of the inter-party coalitions formed during election campaigns? Finally, how does the regrouping of forces within the parties occur, and how is this related to the growing indifference of the masses toward the parties?

Experts know how intensely these and other related topics have been debated in recent years by the U.S. academic community and by our scholars of American affairs.³ They also know that authoritative Soviet scholars who have assessed the processes occurring in the mass base of the American parties and in American public opinion in general have arrived at diametrically opposed conclusions.⁴ These widely diverging views are sometimes the result of different approaches and methods of interpreting major events in the basic institutions of American politics, and frequently they are the result of fundamentally different empirical sources.

What is the reason for this difference in approaches? For a long time, the basic tool for the study of changes in the mass base of the American parties, both in U.S. literature and in ours, was the primarily "bloc" type of analytical category of voter statistics. These categories are well known to anyone familiar with reports on U.S. elections. "Conservatives," "moderates," and "liberals"—these represent the ideological spectrum. "Whites," "blacks," "Hispanics," and "union members"; the sex and age breakdown and the breakdown according to levels of income and education; regional affiliations and some other parameters—these constitute the sociological spectrum. "Firm Republicans," "firm Democrats," and "independents"—these are the patterns of political choice. Finally, the results of earlier elections in all of these categories were also included in the analysis. These and similar data were employed to interpret the dynamics of voter attitudes.

Without denying the integrity of the analytical potential of this group of categories, we must nevertheless acknowledge their limits. For example, one of the most important parameters needed in the analysis of election results and the most essential condition for the comprehension of the full meaning of the electorate's evolution before and during the realignment of forces within parties, namely the motivational basis of the political choices of voters, remained outside the boundaries of this analytical tool's capabilities. Some researchers realized this and compensated for the shortcomings of standard voting statistics by studying additional spheres of social existence and behavior. Above all, they were interested in sociopolitical attitudes, the state of public opinion, the ideological characteristics of the political spectrum, and the prevailing values in election years. Unfortunately, these different areas of voter behavior investigation and interpretation (the analysis of voting statistics combined with the substantive analysis of electoral choices) were not always combined in a single study. This was not always possible from the methodological standpoint because of fundamental differences in procedures. This is the reason for the diversity of assessments and conclusions, the frequent incomparability of results, and the unpredictability of the possible alignment of forces in election campaigns. This is also the reason for the diverse interpretations of election results in the copious political analytical literature of the late 1970's and early 1980's.⁵

Scrupulous studies of election statistics heightened the sense of uncertainty. Prominent American political scientist N. Polsby, for example, noted that the Republican Party did not experience any significant gain in voter support and the Democratic Party did not suffer any serious loss of support in the first half of the 1980's.⁶ Election results did not attest to any kind of realignment either. By the beginning of 1984, for example, 4,624 (or 63 percent) of the 7,363 members of state legislatures were Democrats; Republicans won 300 seats in these legislatures in the 1984 elections, but the Democrats still retained the majority (59 percent). Polsby also noted that Democrats had consistently won gubernatorial and congressional seats in the last 32 years, and this also attested to the stability of voter preferences. On this basis, Polsby concluded that the Democratic Party had been the majority party for the last 30, 40, or even 50 years and was still the majority party from the standpoint of the characteristics of its mass base and of election victories. Similar conclusions were drawn by R. Wolfinger, J. Wilson, T. Ferguson, and J. Rogers.⁷

Discussing the insufficient evidence of a "right turn" in the society, these authors proposed the most diverse explanations for the processes occurring within it. In particular, they pointed to the continuous growth of the group of "independent" voters, which was portrayed unequivocally as evidence of the decline of parties. The idea of the "realignment of the elite" became extremely popular (J. Barnes writes about it as a *fait accompli*)⁸, signifying the convergence of the ideologies and platforms of party elites and the consequent disorientation in public values and behavior. Political scientists T. Ferguson and J. Rogers felt that the collapse of the system of political preferences dating back to the days of the "New Deal" was not the result of realignment in the parties, but of fundamental changes within the ranks of the political elite due to the "structural transformation of the world economy" and the United States' role in it.⁹ In the opinion of Ferguson and Rogers, these changes first led to the disorganization of the elite and then motivated it to form a new coalition with a platform contrary to the ideals of the "New Deal."

In spite of the definitely constructive aspects of this approach, the attempt to separate American public opinion from the position of the party elite cannot reproduce the complete picture of changes in public attitudes or explain the nature of changes in the political process itself in the United States. The statements about the non-existent realignment of party forces on one side and about the disintegration of the traditional "New Deal" coalition during the 1980 and 1984 elections on the other would seem to contradict one another.

In 1982 D. Everson remarked in this context that the data of sociological election research "can be used to support almost any point of view—a shift to the right, to the center, or to the left."¹⁰ The usual depiction of voter

behavior as a set of variable but always balanced quantities (an increase in conservatism decreases the potential of liberalism, and vice versa) turned out to be groundless in the 1980's. Stressing this, political scientist E. Ladd noted that neither the Right nor the Left was dominating public opinion at that time, and that opinion was developing not as a result of "some new conflict between old ideological values" but as a result of the appearance of new parameters to which the old formulas simply did not apply.¹¹ In 1980 Ladd and S. Lipset wrote about the emergence of something like a "new synthesis" of public political attitudes, marked by the simultaneous viability of liberal and conservative views.¹²

As researchers grew increasingly dissatisfied with the traditional parameters for the assessment of public opinion and voter behavior, the need for new tools for the analysis of electoral processes on the basis of substantive, valuative categories arose. The existence of a permanent huge army of non-voting Americans, difficult to define in political terms, and the instability of the party preferences of "independent" voters only compounded this need.

Demand quickly engendered supply: The results of an extensive study of American attitudes, undertaken by the Gallup Organization in conjunction with the Times Mirror publishing firm and conducted on the basis of fundamentally new, value-oriented methods of studying public opinion, were published in the United States in September 1987.¹³ What did the research indicate and what were the fundamental features of the new methods?

The study was based on numerous detailed interviews of 4,244 Americans from 25 April to 10 May 1987 and focused on nine basic parameters derived with the aid of factor analysis and revealing, in the opinion of the authors, the most common value judgments of the respondents. They were the attitude toward religion, the degree of ideological tolerance (the acknowledgement of the freedom to promote any views and values whatsoever), the attitude toward social justice (opinions regarding the government's responsibility for social justice and public well-being), the attitude toward militant anticommunism (opinions regarding the need to deter communism with a "militant policy of defense"), the degree of alienation (disillusionment with the potential of the American system), the presence of the belief in American exclusivity, the respondent's assessment of his own social and financial status, his attitude toward the federal government, and his attitude toward the business community.

These "basic values and judgments," manifested independently of the respondents' political views, can produce a more precise picture of the sociopolitical attitudes of Americans, in the opinion of the authors of this study, than the attempt to discern their party preferences, define their views in "liberal" or "conservative" terms, etc.

By clarifying these nine basic parameters in the survey—i.e., by asking around 10 questions to clarify opinions within the context of each parameter—the authors not only derived a broad, detailed, and sufficiently representative picture of the present state of sociopolitical attitudes in the United States, but were also able to divide the respondents into 11 groups on the basis of the substantive similarity of their views rather than ideological or party similarities. These groups, according to the Times Mirror experts, cover the entire range of affiliations, judgments, perceptions, needs, and attitudes in the American political sphere today. Giving the groups extremely conditional names in line with their most dominant features, the authors constructed the following system of classification.

The leaders: The well-to-do suburbanites constituting 10 percent of the adult population and 16 percent of the potential voting public—99 percent white and 99 percent Republican. They support private initiative and a free market economy and oppose government regulation and higher taxes as means of reducing the deficit and additional expenditures on public health and social assistance. They support the “Star Wars” program and aid to the contras in Nicaragua.

The moralists: 11 percent of the adult population and 14 percent of the potential voting public. The majority are middle-aged, middle-income Republicans and Republican Party sympathizers—up to 99 percent. They vehemently oppose abortion and support compulsory prayer in the schools, the death penalty, and restrictions on AIDS patients. They express extreme anticommunist and pro-militarist views.

The optimists: 9 percent of the adult population and 9 percent of the potential voting public. These are middle-income people with a secondary or partial higher education under the age of 40. They are white, and 66 percent are Republicans and 13 percent are Democrats. They oppose aid to the contras and display a greater interest in economic issues and the budget deficit. They have strong ultra-patriotic feelings and are distinguished by the typical complexes of “upwardly mobile” groups: optimism and an emphasis on self-reliance and personal success. In 1984, 86 percent of them voted for Ronald Reagan.

The dissatisfied: 9 percent of the adult population and 7 percent of the potential voting public. These are middle-aged and middle-income people experiencing personal financial problems; 44 percent are Republicans and 26 percent are Democrats. They oppose stronger government regulation but also object to the omnipotence of the business community and support gun control. They support stronger American military potential and broader social spending (with the exception of programs for ethnic minorities).

The temporizers: 11 percent of the adult population. They are under the age of 30 and have an inadequate education. They have no interest in politics; 29 percent are Republicans and 33 percent are Democrats and Democratic Party sympathizers. Their participation in elections is dubious because most of them do not care who the president will be. The issues of the greatest concern to them are unemployment, poverty, and disarmament.

The followers: 7 percent of the population and 4 percent of the potential voting public. These are young adults; up to 25 percent are blacks and 18 percent are Hispanics. Most of them are physical laborers with a low level of education; 23 percent are Republicans and 55 percent are Democrats. They are easily manipulated in political matters and unemployment is their greatest concern.

The secularists: 8 percent of the adult population and 9 percent of the potential voting public; 16 percent are Republicans and 77 percent are Democrats. They support defense spending cuts, abortion, and stronger environmental protection regulations. They oppose compulsory prayer in the schools. They are most concerned about the budget deficit. Most of these well-educated, middle-aged people are specialists and self-employed individuals.

The sixties-era Democrats: 8 percent of the population and 11 percent of the potential voting public. They are well educated and the majority (60 percent) are women; 3 percent are Republicans and 90 percent are Democrats. They actively support higher social spending and increased social activity by government and business. They are highly tolerant of the views and lifestyles of others. They strongly oppose “Star Wars” and are convinced of the need to normalize Soviet-American relations.

The Roosevelt Democrats: 11 percent of the population and 15 percent of the potential voting public. These are workers who belong to labor unions and are beyond middle age; 90 percent are Democrats. They support stricter abortion laws and prayer in the schools and are intolerant in matters of morality. They advocate higher social spending, with the exception of programs of assistance for ethnic minorities. They support “Star Wars” and the idea of a “strong America.”

The politically passive poor: poorly educated, low-income, and mostly southern; 7 percent of the adult population and 6 percent of the potential voting public; 8 percent are Republicans and 87 percent are Democrats. They support higher social spending across the board and are the most vigorous advocates of tax increases. The ideas of “Star Wars” and higher defense spending are popular with this group.

The radical poor: 9 percent of the population and 9 percent of the potential voting public. These are poorly educated inhabitants of southern cities with a low

income; 98 percent are Democrats. Unemployment is their greatest concern. They display strong support for all types of social assistance—but without an increase in taxes. They advocate defense spending cuts and support the death penalty and prayer in the schools.

The authors of this article never intended to conduct a detailed assessment of the Times Mirror research methods: This is a completely separate topic and, in view of its fundamental, and not solely historiographic, uniqueness and importance, it requires separate analysis. It must be said, however, that even a preliminary examination of the resulting breakdown suggests that the principle of categorization the American specialists chose is not completely accurate from the scientific standpoint. Perhaps the authors did not notice this, but they ended up with groups that would be difficult to compare: the "moralists" (based on moral categories) and the "passive poor" (based on economic status or income level); the "Roosevelt Democrats" (based on age) and the "optimists" (based on a type of individual mobility and self-appraisal). We can assume that the underlying causes of the behavior and choices of voters in these different groups will be just as distinct, and this does nothing to clarify the motives for various party preferences. Nevertheless, with consideration for this and several other reservations and without waiting for the Times Mirror methods to be verified by the November election results, which is what the American specialists intend to do, we can draw some conclusions today.

Above all, we feel that the study of American public opinion quite conclusively attests not only to the "erosion" of the bases on which earlier party coalitions were once formed, but also to the existence of other incentives and motives uniting voters around parties and candidates. The value judgments and the social expectations of members of specific social groups (the socially insecure Americans—for example, members of labor unions, ethnic minorities, the middle strata, etc.), which were traditionally regarded as reliable indicators of the party affiliations of voters, seem to have ceased to play this role today. The same values and political objectives are now increasingly likely to be characteristic of different groups of voters and different social strata and categories. In the Times Mirror study this process of the "reorientation" of voters is most clearly revealed in the attitudes of members of various groups toward such concepts as the social practices and social responsibilities of the government and the legacy of the "New Deal." The transformation of the social role of government as a result of Roosevelt's policies still affects the political preferences of Americans on quite disparate social levels. They consistently acknowledge the government's obligation to guarantee each citizen a minimum income and shelter. This idea does not appear to have undergone any significant changes under the influence of the individualistic Republican rhetoric: This is the opinion of 62 percent of the respondents belonging to various groups in the Times Mirror study. Furthermore, they feel that this ideal can be attained primarily through higher social

spending: 75 percent of the respondents support higher federal allocations for programs to assist the elderly, 68 percent support higher spending on aid to the homeless, 64 percent support additional allocations for social security, 71 percent support higher allocations for medical care, 58 percent support additional expenditures on aid to farmers, etc. This attitude toward social spending is characteristic of the overwhelming majority of the voting public, Republican and Democratic, and this is an extremely noteworthy fact! The only exception is the group of Republican voters conditionally termed the "leaders." Only 24 percent of these potential voters agree with these statements about the role of government, but even in this group 44 percent support increased aid to senior citizens, 42 percent support higher allocations for medical care, 60 percent support higher federal allocations for AIDS research, and 49 percent support additional allocations for the fight against drug addiction.¹⁴

We can assume that this "standardization of values," revealed not only in the attitudes of voters toward the social practices of the government but also in their views on other domestic and foreign policy issues, will result in a slightly different type of political choice, in which substantive, pragmatic factors will play the deciding role instead of party considerations or the party affiliation of the candidate. This is corroborated by the frequent display of such characteristics as tolerance for opposing views and the generally more pragmatic reasons for political choices.

In spite of the obvious tendency toward the erosion of traditional ideological views, the criteria of tolerance (signifying, as we mentioned above, the recognition of the possibility of the free coexistence of different opinions, points of view, lifestyles, ways of thinking, and ideological principles) are becoming decisive factors in revealing the progressive or reactionary nature of the attitudes of various groups and individuals. The concept of tolerance has acquired special importance in American politics in recent years in connection with the tremendous significance attached to questions of ethics, religion, and morality, as well as to environmental protection and the law and, finally, to foreign policy issues (attitudes toward military spending, aid to the contras, and disarmament).¹⁵ It is indicative that extreme intolerance in matters of morality is generally combined with rabid anticommunism and aggressive foreign policy views.¹⁶

There has been an apparent tendency, incidentally, toward the localization of the nucleus of intolerance for communism and for any other divergent views within the confines of strictly defined groups. The position of the "moralists" is indicative. They advocate strong defense and the active use of military force, fuel the fears of "communist aggression," foment mistrust of the USSR, deny the possibility of compromise, and are firmly convinced that arms reduction talks should be conducted exclusively from a position of strength, if not superiority.

The so-called Roosevelt Democrats, representing one of the main segments of this party's electorate, have views similar to those of this pro-Republican group. The reasons for this unexpected similarity of seemingly diametrically opposed (in terms of party preferences at any rate) groups and for the apparent "coalition potential" here require additional study. It is possible that these reasons date back to the period of the political socialization of the members of these groups—after all, this occurred in the 1940's and 1950's, the era of McCarthyism and "cold war." In any case, the seemingly unnatural community of values of the pro-Republican "moralists" and the "Roosevelt Democrats" offers more evidence of the ambiguity of sociopolitical attitudes and represents one of the conditions for an unexpected turn of events in November. This possibility, however, is beginning to depend more and more on the general weakness of party criteria of group formation rather than on the convergence of groups with different party affiliations but similar ideological views. The ideological tolerance revealed by the Times Mirror study, in spite of its obviously relative nature and the American features of this phenomenon, is becoming a prerequisite for large-scale transfers of voters from one party to another, the priority of the candidate's personality in the voter's choice, and the voter's heightened interest in the substantive aspects of campaign platforms at the expense of purely party considerations.

It is indicative that the groups which have reached their peak of political activity or are approaching it (from 35 to 55 years of age) are distinguished by greater tolerance, including tolerance in international affairs.

In spite of the general appeal of the Republican Party to voters under the age of 30, they are also distinguished by greater tolerance. They are less likely to be anticommunists and less religious than older generations. Besides this, they are more disturbed by economic problems, are less ideologized, and are more receptive to different ideas and values than members of older generations. Party loyalty and party ideological principles are less important to them, and this suggests that the political choices of these American voters might be less stable.

As we have already pointed out, the erosion of traditional ideological premises and consistent loyalty to a single party is also a result of the stronger pragmatic features of public opinion in the 1980's. Elections are depending more and more on "what the politician plans to do" rather than on his party affiliation. When a public opinion poll was conducted in 1983 to learn American attitudes toward the Reagan economic model, for example, it turned out that two-thirds of the 53 percent of the Americans who supported this model said that they did this only because they felt it was having a positive impact.¹⁷ According to D. Everson, at this time "Americans vote less on the basis of ideological considerations than on the basis of pragmatic evaluations of the results of administration performance."¹⁸ This is confirmed by

the "blocs" lying at the basis of the system of categorization used in the Times Mirror study: They clearly reveal an emphasis on substantive, pragmatic values and premises instead of ideological values.

The spread of ideological tolerance and receptivity to different points of view, in combination with the generally more pragmatic nature of American political preferences, also offers adequate explanations of the evolution of party platforms and party policies in recent years. To a considerable extent, these processes also explain the so-called "rightward shift in the Democratic Party" (beginning with the generation of "Hart Democrats") and the Republicans' departure from the rigid, ideologized rhetoric of the late 1970's and early 1980's and the transformation of their domestic and foreign policy positions. These processes, which are reflected in the sociopolitical attitudes of Americans and in party structures, suggest a slightly different interpretation of the now familiar statements about the "decline" or "crisis" of the American parties and the weaker party affiliations of voters. Now we are more likely to point to the modification or transformation of the criteria of party performance and other parameters and appraisals of their contact with the general public, the disappearance of traditional and appearance of new elements of party functioning in the sphere of ideology and in political practices. Not all of these processes are completely definite; most of them have just become apparent and still represent emerging trends, but the distinctive features of the state of the American mind today discussed in this article—the more pragmatic nature of political choices and the tolerance for divergent views—appear to be fairly stable and lasting developments.

The November election results will already be known when the readers receive this issue of the journal. They will answer many questions, including a confirmation or denial of the validity of the Times Mirror methods and of the preliminary predictions made on this basis.

Even before we receive the exact figures, however, we can assume that the election will reveal the indefinite and chaotic nature of American affiliations and beliefs today. The confusion of values in political thinking and the weaker link between the voter and "his" party are salient features of the complex politico-ideological situation of the transitional period represented by the 1970's and 1980's. This is a fairly extensive development, and it is too early to judge the future effects of these processes. Will they continue to develop steadily in the future, weakening the voter's adherence to "his" party's line, or will they be followed by another ideologization of domestic politics instead (as in the early 1950's and then in the late 1960's and 1970's)? Will the party distinctions and politico-ideological polarization of the general public become more pronounced? Time will tell.

Footnotes

1. K. Phillips, "The Emerging Republican Majority," New York, 1970.

2. Ibid.

3. See: "Party Coalitions in the 1980's," edited by S. Lipset, San Francisco, 1981; T. Ferguson and J. Rogers, "Right Turn. The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics," New York, 1986; A.S. Manykin and N.V. Sivachev, "The Two-Party System in the United States: Past and Present (Some Methodological Problems and Studies)," NOVAYA I NOVEY-SHAYA ISTORIYA, 1978, No 3.

4. See, for example, V.O. Pechatnov, "Some New Trends in the Functioning of the Two-Party System in the 1970's and Early 1980's," in "Problemy amerikanistiki" [Topics in American Area Studies], Moscow, 1983, pp 76-100; D.Ye. Furman, "The Decline of the American Two-Party System and the Evolution of American Public Opinion," VOPROSY FILOSOFII, 1987, No 6, pp 123-131.

5. "The Future Under President Reagan," edited by W. Valis, Westport (Conn.), 1981; E. Wright, "Ideology of Reaganism," ENCOUNTER, 1982, vol 58, No 3, pp 65-68; L. Barret, "Gambling with History: Ronald Reagan in the White House," Garden City (N.Y.), 1983; W. Miller and T. Levitin, "Leadership and Change: The New Politics and the American Electorate," Cambridge (Mass.), 1976; R. Samuelson, "Fragmentation and Uncertainty Litter the Political Landscape," NATIONAL JOURNAL, 20 October 1979.

6. N. Polsby, "The Democratic Nomination and the Evolution of the Party System," in "The American Election of 1984," edited by A. Ranney, Durham (N.C.), 1985, pp 36-38.

7. R. Wolfinger, "Dealignment, Realignment and Mandates in the 1984 Election," in "The American Election of 1984," pp 277-296; J. Wilson, "Realignment at the Top. Dealignment at the Bottom," in "The American Election of 1984," pp 297-310; T. Ferguson and J. Rogers, Op. cit.

8. NATIONAL JOURNAL, 14 May 1988, p 1295.

9. T. Ferguson and J. Rogers, Op. cit., p 196.

10. D. Everson, "Public Opinion Interest Groups in American Politics," New York, 1982, p 139.

11. E. Ladd, "Politics in the 80's: An Electorate at Odds with Itself," PUBLIC OPINION, 1983, vol 5, No 6, pp 2-5.

12. E. Ladd and S. Lipset, "Anatomy of a Decade," PUBLIC OPINION, 1980, vol 3, No 1, pp 2-9.

13. "The People, the Press and Politics. A Times Mirror Study of the American Electorate Conducted by the Gallup Organization," September 1987.

14. Ibid., p 39.

15. Ibid., pp 36-37.

16. Ibid., p 41.

17. "Opinion Roundup: State of the Presidency," PUBLIC OPINION, 1984, vol 7, No 1, p 38.

18. D. Everson, Op. cit., p 136.

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France Said To See SDI as Threat to Own Nuclear Strategy

18030005b Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 88 (signed to press 24 Oct 88) pp 21-29

[Article by Viktor Sergeyevich Mikheyev, candidate of historical sciences and senior scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "SDI and France"]

[Text] Although England, the FRG, and Italy have begun participating in SDI research and have reinforced this participation with the appropriate bilateral agreements and memorandums, France is not taking part in this research officially. Why not? Why does Paris oppose the American politico-military doctrine for the 21st century? What are the reasons for these disagreements? The answer is connected with the distinctive features of French foreign policy since the time of de Gaulle, the differences in French and American military strategies, Paris' hope of playing the leading role in politico-military integration in Western Europe, and other factors. The entire group of questions will be investigated in this article.

The "Strategic Defense Initiative," which the United States announced unilaterally, without consulting its allies, presented French leaders with several problems of fundamental importance. These were problems in the assessment of U.S. military space doctrine, its effects on France's status as a nuclear power, French military policy in light of the possible creation of ABM systems in space, strategic stability, the limitation of the arms race, Atlantic solidarity in the nuclear space age, and its relationship to the French plans for the establishment of a West European "power center" independent of the "superpowers."

First of all, SDI is seen as a program undermining strategic stability rather than as a stabilizing factor. The French leadership did not believe it would be possible to create an impenetrable antimissile shield and thereby rid mankind of "impotent and obsolete" ballistic missiles. Incidentally, in a report to Congress, former U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger stated, in the most precise terms, that when the United States proposed the SDI, it was only intensifying the search for new possibilities for

the American strategy of "flexible response" and expanding its parameters.¹ In this way, he essentially admitted something that had been obvious to the French leaders from the very beginning: The SDI did not hold out the promise of getting rid of nuclear weapons, but would simply add a space ABM system to existing arsenals and thereby complicate the strategic balance considerably.

No one in France took Reagan seriously when he made his famous statement that the United States would endeavor to preserve strategic stability by "sharing" the technology of the space-based ABM system with the Soviet Union. In Paris, which is, incidentally, the site of CoCom headquarters—the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control, which was established during the "cold war" years—people were well aware of the United States' years of effort to expand the prohibitive export lists through the inclusion of more and more new "strategic goods and technologies." As former Prime Minister P. Mauroy of France said, it was odd, to say the least, that the United States would categorically object to deliveries of French and other equipment for the Soviet pipeline and adhere to the rules of economic blockade while announcing that it would share its most advanced, top-secret military technology with the USSR.

A space ABM system could not completely neutralize a nuclear missile strike but it could diminish it. One of Paris' greatest fears in connection with SDI is the possibility that the Soviet Union will create its own ABM system in response to the American one (although the USSR spoke of asymmetrical countermeasures). France's security is based on nuclear deterrence, and it cannot remain indifferent to the evolution of defensive technology when this could jeopardize the effectiveness of French strategic nuclear forces.²

The consequences of this turn of events, in the opinion of French leaders, would be disastrous. Since the time of de Gaulle, independent nuclear deterrence has been regarded as the material basis of France's self-sufficiency and greatness and of the country's autonomous position in NATO. In Paris they believe that nuclear weapons will allow France to play the leading role in the creation of the West European "power center" and act as the main driving force of politico-military integration in Western Europe. The French leadership is convinced that the possession of nuclear weapons is an essential condition for retaining the status of a world power. Furthermore, as U.S. Library of Congress researcher S. Sloan remarked, SDI represents a much more serious problem to France than to the other West European nuclear power—Great Britain. "British nuclear forces," he wrote, "are closely interwoven into the common strategy and forces of NATO and are not the basis of British defense policy. France's non-participation in the integrated command structure of NATO and its independent military policy are based primarily on its ability to aim its strategic offensive weapons at Soviet territory. As a result of Soviet countermeasures to SDI, the sizable

sums France has spent on the creation of nuclear forces could be a complete waste, and this would put France's entire military policy in question."³ Looking back over the many dramatic events in the history of their country, which was at war with Germany three times in the last hundred or so years, French politicians have no doubt that "nuclear intimidation" is the most effective way of safeguarding security, and not only from the purely military standpoint but also in terms of the "cost-effectiveness" criterion. A report published in June 1986 in connection with SDI by the Council of the Western European Union (WEU), to which England, France, the FRG, Italy, and the Benelux countries belong, included, at the insistence of France and England, the statement that "nuclear intimidation" is "the only effective means of preventing war."⁴

France, with its much smaller quantities of material resources than the United States and the USSR, has around 1.5-2 percent of the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the "superpowers" on its strategic carriers. On the one hand, this figure seems negligible. On the other, according to French data, it would take less than half of the present arsenal to kill 20 million people and wound approximately the same number. The French leadership hopes to secure the ability to inflict "unacceptable losses" on the adversary. Then France, in Paris' opinion, would be an equal member of the world "nuclear club" (even if not an equal "superpower," but one with quite impressive rights in any case).

These nuclear calculations, however, were complicated by SDI. Instead of proposing something desirable for France—the limitation of Soviet and American strategic weapons with a simultaneous buildup of France's own (which would be most in line with the French plans to reduce the gap in the nuclear sphere between it and the "superpowers")—it presupposed not the simple intensification of military competition but its transfer to a qualitatively new level in space, with the prospect of an increasing French lag in an atmosphere of what Paris feared might be a possible reduction of the effectiveness of France's strategic nuclear missiles. In the minds of the French leaders, this turn of events would mean the devaluation of France's national greatness and a downward slide on the world table of ranks.

France was deeply wounded by a thesis publicized in connection with SDI to promote an idea France did not expect—the Reagan administration's thesis that the concept of "mutual assured destruction" was immoral because it was based on the threat of a retaliatory strike which would annihilate the population. In his previously mentioned report to Congress, Weinberger defended SDI, stressing that deliberate plans to kill the population were "immoral and insane."⁵ But after all, all of French strategy is based on the threat of a retaliatory strike against the cities of the adversary!

F. Mitterand believes that this approach is justified because it does not presuppose the use of nuclear weapons as a means of warfare, as in the case of the NATO

strategy of "flexible response," but the prevention of war with the threat of "total retaliation." Plans for exchanges of nuclear strikes in Europe seem particularly unacceptable to Mitterand.⁶ During his meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense F. Carlucci in Paris on 11 January 1988, he tried to convince his American guest that the United States and NATO should adopt France's strategy of "total retaliation."⁷ Later, during a meeting with a group of American senators in February, he also advocated NATO's rejection of the strategy of "flexible response."⁸ Mitterand welcomed the Soviet-American INF Treaty specifically because it would eliminate one of the material bases of the strategy of "flexible response"—an entire class of modern nuclear weapons.⁹

An important reason for France's objections to SDI is the unequal participation the Americans have proposed. "Star Wars" is an American program with the partial inclusion of the allies as "subcontractors" without any voting rights, because they were not offered a chance to take part in the planning of military or industrial strategy. Mitterand's objections to France's participation on "vassal" terms reveal the influence of Gaullist foreign policy principles and traditions. The U.S. leadership, however, has no more intention today than it did a quarter of a century ago to give the allies an equal say in the planning of Western politico-military strategy.

The French leaders have no doubt that if their country should have to join a space arms race, the attempts to retain its strategic position would severely overextend its resources. After all, France even had difficulty developing the first Helios observation satellite, and it is no coincidence that it has persistently tried to involve its own West European partners in the development of space vehicles for resource surveys and exploration. But if Paris had difficulty making even one of the first steps toward the military use of space (and not even one connected with the development of space attack weapons), it would have even more trouble competing in a race for offensive weapons on earth and in space.

The United States' attempts to encourage the allies to participate in SDI are inconsistent with one of the main goals of French foreign policy—to lessen Western Europe's politico-military dependence on the United States and enhance its autonomy under France's leadership. It was obvious to the French leaders that the participation of the Old World in such a massive American strategic program would seriously impede West European integration in all of its spheres—economic, political, military, scientific, and technical. Instead of the desirable expansion of autonomy, planning of independent strategy, and concentration of resources in areas high on the list of West European priorities, part of these resources would be diverted to meet the needs of the American program. France objects to SDI because, in Paris' opinion, participation in it would mean consent to its strategic consequences and the transfer of advanced West European technology to the United States. French experts saw SDI as an attempt by the United States to

reinforce its role as the leader of the Western camp by political means and to generate strong momentum for the development of advanced fields of American technology with the use of West European experience and for the enhancement of the U.S. economy's competitive potential in the world market.¹⁰

In view of the sizable deficit in the U.S. federal budget and the mounting support in Congress for the reduction of the American military presence in Europe, French experts are worried that Washington will reallocate part of the funds earmarked for NATO to SDI. "In essence, SDI is not only a threat to the survival of advanced sectors of industry in the Old World but could also lead to the massive reallocation of NATO appropriations for the defense of Europe to the development of a highly expensive shield of dubious value to the Europeans—a far from gratifying prospect," wrote Deputy Director P. Lellouche of the French Institute of International Relations.¹¹ Several politicians in France and other West European countries see SDI as a program for the military "denudation" of Western Europe and the dangerous separation of the defenses of the Old and New Worlds when an antimissile shield covers the territory of the United States.

Although the reasons for France's opposition to SDI are serious, it would be wrong to categorically describe its attitude as a negative one. In the first place, there are nuances even in the views expressed by President Mitterand and his associates. In the second place, SDI has influential supporters with pro-Atlantic rather than Gaullist views in France, especially in the government.

Although Mitterand has objected to France's participation in SDI on the intergovernmental level, the interest in access to advanced technology has kept him from discouraging autonomous participation by private French companies.¹² By the middle of 1987, Matra, Thomson, Reosc, and other firms had signed four contracts with the Pentagon on participation in SDI for a sum of 3.4 million dollars.¹³ The small scales are due to the U.S. administration's wish to exert pressure on France for its official inclusion in SDI by artificially deterring cooperation with French firms. This is also supposed to intensify the efforts of French supporters of SDI. Colonel Ruth Anderson, deputy chief of the SDI multinational programs division, stated: "France's participation would be more complete if the French Government had wanted to sign an agreement with the American Government. We want to deal with just one French partner because of political considerations and because the secret technology we have to transmit before projects can begin should be entrusted only to governments, and not to enterprises."¹⁴

Although Mitterand has voiced his opposition to SDI, he is certain that strategy in the next century will necessarily be of a "space nature" and that the new military space equipment will turn all strategies "upside-down."¹⁵ An AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE report from Paris on 14

February 1986 said that a French interdepartmental commission on space weapons research had decided in January 1986 that France will have to be more active in this field so that it will be prepared for an arms race in space. The commission's recommendations included more active work in the spheres of continuous or pulse lasers, directed energy weapons, electromagnetic pulse guns, x-ray lasers, and electronic equipment to "blind" enemy radar, and research in such fields as free-electron lasers and electron accelerators. In other words, the commission recommended the commencement of the research stage of France's own SDI. Therefore, although France's official position at this time is that it is against a race for offensive space weapons, some skepticism with regard to the prospects for its prevention and the desire for insurance in case the worst should happen have forced Paris to consider the possibility of participating in it. At this time, however, the law on military programs for 1987-1991 envisages allocations of 9.2 billion francs for the use of space for military purposes. They are intended for the Syracuse-2 communication satellite program and the first Helios observation satellite, which are scheduled to be launched into orbit in 1992 and 1993 respectively. This is a fundamental feature distinguishing the French military space program from the American one, because the United States intends to develop an offensive space weapon.

The possibility of the use of French civilian space programs for military purposes cannot be excluded. For example, France is developing the Hermes space shuttle, which will be able to carry six astronauts and a payload of 1.5 tons (American shuttles can carry eight people and a payload of 32 tons). The Hermes will be launched into orbit by the Aryan-5 rocket the European Space Agency is developing. An article in THE WASHINGTON POST by J. Dumoulins, deputy editor in chief of the French weekly L'EXPRESS, said that, in France's opinion, "the Aryan-5 rocket and the Hermes space shuttle are the means by which the Europeans will achieve a civilian presence and perhaps someday play a definite military role in outer space."¹⁶

The fear that "antimissile weapons will bring about a strategic dilemma one fine day"¹⁷ stimulated the modernization of French nuclear weapons in a search for new possibilities for "enhanced deterrence"—i.e., a greater ability to surmount enemy ABM systems. Allocations for this purpose already amounted to 116 million francs in the military budget for 1984,¹⁸ and to 550 million in 1985.¹⁹ According to P. Quiles, acting French minister of defense, by 1991 France plans to have a new nuclear warhead for the M-4 missiles on submarines and complete the first phase of the program of support systems for surmounting ABM systems.²⁰ French strategic missiles of a new type, with small warheads almost invisible to radar, should be ready for use in 1994. The walls of the missile body will be thicker.²¹ American expert R. Laird believes that SDI is encouraging French strategists to set their sights on cruise missiles, especially sea-launched missiles, and could urge France to decide to arm itself

with the neutron weapons which have already been developed²² (but have not been deployed for political reasons—V.M.). This reaction on the part of one of the United States' main allies confirms the accuracy of the Soviet assessment of SDI, according to which the creation of a large-scale ABM system by one side will lead unavoidably to countermeasures by the other side for the purpose of surmounting this system and maintaining the balance of power. The result is the vicious, age-old circle of competition between means of offense and defense.

The modernization of nuclear missiles represents France's military response to SDI. In addition, however, serious diplomatic efforts were made to prevent participation in "Star Wars" by the leading countries of Western Europe, on whose support Paris is relying in its plans for the establishment of the West European "power center."

In April 1985 France proposed the EUREKA program as a direct alternative to West European participation in SDI. This grandiose project, with the aid of which the Europeans hope to restore their position in relation to the United States and Japan, envisages research in data processing technology, telecommunications, robot engineering, the development of new materials, biotechnology, laser engineering, and other fields. The purpose of EUREKA is the integration of West European efforts in the development of advanced technology with a view to the 21st century—a leap into the future with a view to Western Europe's own needs, and not to American needs. Technological integration, which would considerably supplement political and economic integration, and on a broader basis than the Common Market, should, according to Paris' plans, strengthen Western Europe's independence of the United States. France also hopes to use EUREKA in the future to urge its West European partners to develop space survey and observation vehicles jointly, and independently of the United States,²³ as F. Mitterand proposed in his speech in The Hague on 7 February 1983. (He declared at that time that a West European manned space station would be "the best response to tomorrow's military realities.")²⁴ The American administration and the French leadership are fighting a real battle for allies.

The controversy over EUREKA and SDI revealed two essentially conflicting approaches to Western politico-military integration. The United States believes that it should be accomplished on the "Atlantic" basis and under U.S. guidance. France, on the other hand, in the anticipation of growing West European economic strength, is encouraging broader politico-military autonomy for Western Europe, regarding the current excessive dependence of the West European countries on their senior partner as an abnormal situation. Paris wants to lead the process of relatively autonomous West European integration.

All of this appears much more complex in the sphere of political practices. Whereas Washington's stance on economic integration has been positive in general (although

it is significant that private American companies have taken every opportunity to split the front of West European competitors opposing them), its responses to steps toward politico-military integration in Western Europe have been ambiguous. Washington had a severely negative reaction to France's proposal in March 1985 of WEU consultations on SDI, because it feels that actions of this kind by its allies will undermine American leadership in NATO and weaken the bloc itself. For the United States it was important to keep West European technological integration from gaining priority over "Atlantic" integration of a politico-military nature, and it concentrated on this accordingly. France's strong opposition to SDI, however, forced the U.S. administration to employ various gambits. Ronald Reagan admitted that SDI would "create a problem" for French and British nuclear forces and that the move from an "offensive" to a "defensive" strategy was a "genuinely complex issue." He also promised the allies that the decision to move from the research stage to the stage of the deployment of the ABM system with space-based elements would not be made without consulting them and the Soviet Union.²⁵ Reagan said he was willing to discuss the EUREKA project with F. Mitterand, to which Mitterand publicly replied in an interview on TF-1 on 28 April 1985 that EUREKA was a West European program and did not need the blessing of the Americans. Later Reagan underscored the compatibility of EUREKA and SDI,²⁶ and this became the basis of American tactics with regard to the program the French had proposed.

Caught between the United States on one side and France, expressing autonomous West European interests, on the other, England, the FRG, and Italy have taken a mediating position, striving not to shake the foundations of "Atlanticism" and not to sacrifice the French idea of technological integration in Western Europe as an important part of the overall process of integration. They agreed to participate in SDI, but only in the research stage, and stipulated that the United States must not denounce the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty and that the deployment of the ABM system must be negotiated (now that it has convinced these countries to participate in SDI, the American administration is advocating a "broader" interpretation of the treaty, which is nullifying its content). France's West European partners simultaneously agreed to participate in EUREKA. Therefore, the French plan to make EUREKA an alternative to SDI did not work, but the American plan did not work completely either. Although the participation of these countries in SDI weakens EUREKA and demonstrates the absence of West European unity, the number of EUREKA projects nevertheless reached 165 after the fifth intergovernmental conference on the EUREKA program, attended by representatives of 19 West European countries and the Commission of the European Communities, was held in Madrid on 15 September 1987. Their estimated cost is around 3.5 billion ECU. Over 600 firms and research institutes will take part in the work on the

program. France is participating in 83 projects, and its financial contribution in 1987 totaled 1.2 billion francs (400 million from the government and 800 million from private firms). Participants in the EUREKA program will encounter many difficulties characteristic of West European integration in general, but the main one will probably be the absence of financial regulation.

Therefore, France, which has a certain degree of politico-military autonomy as far as the United States and NATO are concerned, is adhering to Gaullist foreign policy principles and traditions and has taken a position on SDI that is more independent of Washington than the position of other leading West European countries. It is trying to counter the race for offensive space weapons with a program of West European technological integration. Its main partners—England, the FRG, and Italy—are much more closely attached to the United States by political and military ties and are less consistent. They support the EUREKA program and the continuation of efforts to establish an autonomous West European "power center," but they are always worried about Washington's reaction and are clearly hoping for the abatement of what they term France's "foreign policy radicalism."

Integration efforts in Western Europe are being intensified in the technological and military spheres, including work on nuclear and conventional weapons. This became particularly noticeable after the signing of the Soviet-American INF Treaty, the result of which, as *LE MONDE* warned, might be "a weaker probability of an automatic American response to nuclear or conventional aggression."²⁷ The disillusionment of the countries participating in SDI due to the unimpressive volume of American contracts is also creating more interest in West European integration. Whereas West European firms originally expected to receive at least 15 percent of U.S. allocations for SDI between 1985 and 1989, now they will be competing for only 1 percent of the allocations, according to the calculations of the Federation of American Scientists, and even these allocations have been cut from 26 billion dollars to 18 billion.²⁸ The creation of the Franco-West German defense council at the level of heads of state and government in January 1988, the discussions by France and England of the possible coordination of targets for their nuclear missiles, the new plans for the joint production of weapons, including the Anglo-French nuclear air-to-surface cruise missile, and the debates in French political circles on the expediency of extending nuclear guarantees to the FRG are all indicative signs of more active integration efforts. In February 1988 F. Mitterand said: "In the event of a Soviet threat to Europe, nothing serious will happen if the Soviet Union can see that its own territory is threatened by the entire complex of American, English, and French nuclear forces."²⁹ Earlier, however, the president never missed an opportunity to underscore the "complete independence" of French nuclear arms in relation to the United States and NATO and never spoke of the "entire complex." When he was interviewed by *IZVESTIYA* on 2 December 1987, he avoided answering

questions about the danger that the integration processes in Western Europe in the politico-military sphere would intensify the separation of the European continent into two blocs.³⁰

In conclusion, we must say that SDI is undermining the broad consensus on military policy issues in France by giving rise to disagreements between rightwing forces—Rally for the Republic (RPR) and Union for French Democracy (UDF)—and the Socialists. During a visit to the United States in summer 1985, rightwing leader J. Chirac, according to an AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE report, advocated Western Europe's participation in SDI during the research stage and during the stage of the deployment of the broad-scale ABM system. During the campaign (for the 1986 parliamentary elections) he called Mitterand's position on SDI "a Gaullist farce." Later, Chirac could support SDI in his capacity as head of government when he served as prime minister until May 1988. What occurred was an impressive political metamorphosis: The leader of the RPR—i.e., the heir of Gaullism by his party affiliation—is taking a pro-Atlantic stand rather than a Gaullist one by stating the need to rely on the United States in the event of a race for offensive space arms, to express solidarity with the United States, and to share the technological advantages of participation in SDI. The right wing believes that France's refusal to participate in SDI will cause a rift in West European ranks, play into the hands of the socialist countries, and threaten the country with technological underdevelopment and a dangerous lessening of its defensive capabilities in the new space dimension of nuclear strategy.³¹

F. Mitterand, the Socialist president, is defending the Gaullist principles of independence and equality as the basis of Franco-American relations. He has stressed that he will not agree to participation in SDI even in spite of the right wing's declarations in favor of this participation in parliament and in the press. "France," the president repeated, "should not take part in a single program in which it cannot take part in making decisions."³²

Foreign policy issues were not the main concern of French voters during the presidential elections in April and May 1988, distinguished by the political duel between F. Mitterand and J. Chirac. Nevertheless, by voting for Mitterand, they voted against France's involvement in SDI and against the "Atlantic" emphasis in national policy.

Footnotes

1. "Report of the Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1987 Budget, FY 1988 Authorization Request and FY 1987-1991 Defense Programs," Washington, 1986, p 74.

2. LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, 10 November 1984.

3. S. Sloan, "SDI and the European Allies: Dazzled or Doubtful?" NATIONAL DEFENSE, May/June 1988, p 59.

4. Quoted in DEFENSE NATIONALE, August/September 1986, p 171.

5. "Report of the Secretary of Defense," p 75.

6. LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, 15 January 1988.

7. Ibid.

8. LE MONDE, 12 February 1988.

9. It must be said, however, that there is no consensus in French political circles on the strategy of "flexible response." Some members of the right wing advocate its development with intermediate-range nuclear weapons and have criticized the Soviet-American treaty for this reason.

10. G. Polycarpe, "De la guerre des etoiles," DEFENSE NATIONALE, December 1986, pp 44-47.

11. P. Lellouche, "SDI and the Atlantic Alliance," THE COMMUNITY QUARTERLY, Fall 1985, pp 220-221.

12. NEWSWEEK, 17 June 1985, p 21.

13. LES ECHOS, 22 July 1987.

14. LE MONDE, 4 October 1986.

15. Ibid., 3 June 1985.

16. THE WASHINGTON POST, 25 February 1986.

17. LA CROIX, 20 June 1984.

18. LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, 10 November 1984.

19. DEFENSE NATIONALE, May 1985, p 167.

20. JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, 8 March 1986.

21. P. Forget, "Element pour une analyse politico-strategique de L'IDS," DEFENSE NATIONALE, March 1986, p 32.

22. R. Laird, "The French Strategic Dilemma," Professional Paper 407, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria (Va.), 1984, p 27.

23. LE MONDE, 3 June 1985.

24. DEFENSE NATIONALE, August/September 1984, p 157.

25. NEWSWEEK, 13 May 1985, p 17.

26. LE FIGARO, 30 September 1985.
27. LE MONDE, 8 December 1987.
28. NEW STATESMAN, 22 January 1988.
29. LE MONDE, 12 February 1988.
30. IZVESTIYA, 2 December 1987.
31. LE MONDE, 11 January 1986.
32. THE WASHINGTON POST, 29 June 1986.

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Problems in Inter-Allied Relations at 1943 Tehran Conference

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[Article by Valentin Mikhaylovich Berezhkov, doctor of historical sciences: "Tehran, 1943—A New Approach"]

[Text] It has been 45 years since the leaders of the three powers making up the anti-Hitler coalition met for the first time in the Iranian capital at the end of November 1943. The meeting was made possible when the struggle against a common enemy united the states with different social systems in a military alliance. The road to the Tehran summit meeting was long and hard. After the new regime came into being in Russia, relations between socialism and capitalism were troubled. For 16 years the United States refused to recognize the Soviet Union, and even the Western powers which did establish diplomatic relations with us did not give up the attempts at the economic and political isolation of the USSR. Their reluctance to create a system of collective security jointly with the Soviet Union for the repulsion of fascist aggression allowed Hitler to start World War II. We must admit that our country also played a part in this turn of events. For instance, there was Stalin's thesis that the main threat was allegedly posed by the "social fascists." This caused a rift in the labor movement in Germany and weakened the struggle against Nazism. We must not forget what was happening inside our country either—the forced collectivization, the mass repression, and the creation of an authoritarian administrative system with its disregard for elementary human rights. All of this gave rise to negative feelings about the USSR and contributed to the creation of the "enemy image" and the spread of the rumors about the "Soviet threat." This is why Western politicians were willing to nurture German militarism and encourage Hitler, who had promised to "destroy Bolshevism."

It was not until after the defeat of France, after the Nazis had occupied almost all of Western Europe and posed a lethal threat to England, that the preconditions were

established for the later unification of Great Britain and the United States with the Soviet Union in the anti-Hitler coalition following Hitler's invasion of the USSR.

Place in History

The Tehran meeting of the leaders of the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain is historically significant because it confirmed Lenin's assumption that the two systems, socialism and capitalism, could live together on the planet. Besides this, the decisions made at the Tehran conference proved that, in spite of the differences between these systems, mutually acceptable agreements could be negotiated and spheres of common interest could be found.

The creation of the anti-Hitler coalition was a far from simple process, but by the time of the Tehran meeting it already seemed as though the experience in military cooperation would lead to the continued unity of the great powers in peacetime. Of course, conflicts and clashes would be unavoidable even after the victory. There were conflicts at the first summit meeting, but the fact that the leaders were able to surmount them and the results of other summit conferences during the war years confirmed the possibility of agreement.

In Tehran, after lengthy procrastination by the Western powers, an agreement was finally reached on the opening of a "second front" and on the exact date of the landing in Normandy. The conference participants reached an agreement on Poland's new borders and discussed the future of Germany. They agreed that one-third of the captured Italian fleet would be turned over to the Soviet Union. The sides agreed on the basic principles of the postwar order, based on the unity and joint actions of the great powers. The Soviet Government's decision to enter the war against Japan after Germany had been defeated was officially confirmed. The American side declared that assistance in the postwar reconstruction of the Soviet Union would be its primary duty. Prospects for cooperation in all spheres in peacetime were discussed in positive tones.

In short, judging by the results of the meeting in the Iranian capital, it appears that an astounding degree of unity prevailed at the Tehran conference and that its participants were pursuing common goals and striving for their maximum attainment.

The Soviet side was genuinely striving to establish equal relations with the Western democracies and expressed its willingness to extend the relationships in the anti-Hitler coalition to the postwar period. This was a completely understandable wish. After the isolation of our country in the pre-war years and after the economic blockade, threats, and invasions, it seemed that the victory over the common enemy would create the possibility of

peaceful development and favorable conditions for friendly relations between nations. All of this was of tremendous significance for the future of the Soviet Union.

Whatever doubts the Soviet people may have had at that time in connection with the nature of imperialism and the obvious hostility of influential elements in the ruling elite of the Western powers toward the Nation of Soviets, it would have been unwise not to take advantage of the slightest chance to build a new relationship with the West for the remaining years of the war and the subsequent period.

The Tehran conference is noteworthy because it was the first meeting of the top leaders of the three powers representing the greatest concentration of military and economic strength and possessing unprecedented authority. They had every reason to praise the results of the conference.

Behind the Facade of Unity

The Tehran declaration of the three powers—drafted by Churchill—was written in a highly solemn, even bombastic style:

"We express our determination that our countries will work together in this time of war and in the subsequent time of peace....

"As for peacetime, we are certain that our consensus will secure a lasting peace. We are fully aware of the great responsibility borne by us and by all of the United Nations for the establishment of the kind of peace that will win the approval of the overwhelming majority of peoples of the world and will eradicate the misfortunes and horrors of war for many generations.

"We have discussed the problems of the future with our diplomatic advisers. We will strive for cooperation and active participation by all countries, large and small, whose people have dedicated their hearts and minds, just as our own people have, to the elimination of tyranny, slavery, oppression, and intolerance. We will welcome them into the world family of democratic countries when they wish to join it....

"We arrived here with hope and determination. We are departing as true friends in spirit and purpose."¹

To what degree did the picture of "consensus" and "friendship" painted in the declaration conform to reality? To answer this question, we must take a closer look at what was going on behind the scenes. According to well-known American researcher James MacGregor Burns: "Behind the facade of unity the statesmen pursued their own national interests. The resulting cynicism paved the way for postwar disillusionment and discord. The delays in opening the second front did more than anything else to arouse Soviet displeasure.... After all, if

the English and Americans planned to land in France only after Germany or Russia had won, did this not prove that the West, in spite of all its denials, was actually pursuing a strategy aimed at draining both Russia and Germany of their energy?"²

The traditional interpretation of the second front issue is that the Soviet delegation in Tehran was able to gain a firm commitment from the Western powers for a landing in Normandy in May or June 1944. We might wonder, however, whether the decision was really the result of Soviet pressure, or was it just that people in Washington and London realized even before the meeting in the Iranian capital that the continued postponement of the invasion was not in their interest?

The American plan for the landing in northern France was drawn up at the beginning of 1942. When General Marshall reported the plan to President Roosevelt, he explained that the success of the plan would depend on "maximum support from the Russian Navy." It is interesting, however, that the time of the landing would depend on two conditions.

1. If the situation on the Russian front should become desperate—i.e., if the success of German armed forces should be complete enough to signal the imminent collapse of Russian resistance. In this case, the attack on the West would be regarded as a sacrifice for the common cause.

2. If the situation of the Germans in Western Europe should become critical.

The first point in the American plan clearly testifies that the Washington strategists were in no hurry to open a second front, preferring to wait and see what happened and to give the Soviet side a chance to make sacrifices "for the common cause."

The second condition is equally indicative. The Western strategists were worried that the Red Army might advance too far to the west if the situation of the Hitlerites should become "critical."

By spring 1943 the situation on the Soviet-German front forced Washington to give the second condition serious consideration. At the beginning of 1943 General Marshall warned Roosevelt that if the Russians should reach Germany before the Western Allies, this would create "an extremely undesirable diplomatic situation."³ Secretary of War Stimson remarked at that time that the continued postponement of the landing in France by the United States and England would create a situation in which "the Soviet Union will claim leadership in the peacemaking process."⁴

The Western Allies could not accept this possibility. The appropriate measures had to be taken without delay. On board the cruiser "Iowa" on the way to Tehran, Roosevelt discussed the issue of the second front with the

chiefs of staff of the American armed forces. The President expressed the opinion that preparations for an invasion of Western Europe had to be begun in earnest. He said: "Soviet troops are only 60 miles from the Polish border and 40 miles from Bessarabia. If they cross the Bug, which they could do in the next 2 weeks, they will be on Romania's doorstep." This is why, the President went on to say, it was time for the Americans to take action in conjunction with the English for the occupation of as much of Europe as possible. The English should occupy France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and southern Germany. The Americans, Roosevelt said, should take northwestern Germany and sail their ships into the ports of Bremen and Hamburg and also to Norway and Denmark. "We must get to Berlin," the President summed up his views. "Then the Soviets can occupy the territory east of it. But Berlin should be taken by the United States."⁵

As we can see, the U.S. administration had acknowledged the need for quicker preparations for the invasion in Western Europe even before the Tehran conference began. It appears that the debates which went on for almost the entire conference and were sometimes quite heated, were inspired by the Western Allies to give the Soviet delegation the impression that it had won a great concession when the exact time of the landing in Normandy was finally stipulated. For 3 years—from June 1941 to June 1944—the Soviet Union was effectively fighting a one-on-one battle with the monstrous military machine of Hitlerite Germany and it would have had to carry this burden even longer if the Red Army's counteroffensive had not made the quick collapse of Hitler's Germany a reality.

Nevertheless, the decision on the landing of the Western Allies in northern France was of great significance for the Soviet Union and, in general, for the shortening of the war on the European continent. When we read the minutes of the Tehran conference and available archival documents today, we can see that the disagreements in Tehran were concerned more with the place of the invasion than the date. We know that Churchill insisted on the "Balkan option," demanding an offensive through Greece, Bulgaria, and farther to the north. He expected English and American troops to take Sofia, Bucharest, Vienna, Budapest, Prague, and even Warsaw before the arrival of the Red Army and to block its move to the west.

Stalin rejected this plan, saying that a landing in Western Europe would help the Soviet Union more effectively. Roosevelt, who wanted to be the first to reach Berlin, supported the plan for the Normandy invasion, and this settled the argument.

The Problem of Poland

The question of Poland was just as complicated. As soon as the anti-Hitler coalition had been formed, the Soviet side wanted the Allies to recognize the Soviet Union's western borders as they were at the time of Hitler's

invasion. This also applied to the Soviet-Polish border of 1939, which ran approximately along the "Curzon line." Lord Curzon, the British foreign secretary, proposed a line defined by the Entente Supreme Council and based on the ethnic factor, and this became the eastern border of Poland, which was resurrected as an independent state as a result of the victory of the October Revolution in Russia.

Now much is being said and written in the West about the so-called "partition of Poland" in 1939, but for some reason no one is saying a word about the effective partition of the Ukraine and Belorussia in 1921. After all, during the war against the young and still weak Soviet Republic, the White Poles forced the Treaty of Riga on us in 1921, divesting the Ukraine and Belorussia of their western territories. In 1931 this injustice was rectified: The western Ukraine and Western Belorussia were added to the Ukrainian and Belorussian SSR's and became part of the USSR. English and U.S. recognition of this fact was obtained in Tehran.

At one of the plenary meetings Churchill submitted a document to the Soviet and American delegations for their approval, which said: "It was decided in principle that the seat of the Polish Government and nation should be located between the so-called Curzon line and the line of the River Oder, with the inclusion of East Prussia and Oppeln Province in Poland."⁶

This proposal was acceptable in general to the Soviet side. Roosevelt had no objections to it either, although he did say that in view of the significant number of voters of the Polish nationality in the United States, he would refrain from making any public statements on the matter at least until after the next presidential election (it was supposed to be held in November 1944).

Later events indicated, however, that London and Washington had taken an extremely equivocal stand on the Polish question. Although Churchill swore that he would try to persuade the Polish government in exile at London to accept the agreement the "Big Three" had reached, he actually closed his eyes to the obstructionist tactics of Polish emigre officials. And Roosevelt even encouraged their intransigence.

Just before Premier S. Mikolajczyk of the Polish government in exile went to Moscow in summer 1944, he flew to Washington and asked Roosevelt what he should do at the upcoming talks in the Kremlin. The President advised Mikolajczyk to postpone any settlement of the border issue. Then U.S. Secretary of State E. Stettinius explained to the Poles that although the Americans could not risk a confrontation with the USSR at that time, Washington policy would change "in the near future," would return to its "basic moral principles and be able to give Poland strong and effective support."⁷ Advice of this kind was completely inconsistent with the decisions reached in Tehran.

After receiving these recommendations, Mikolajczyk went to the talks in Moscow, which were attended by Churchill, and continued to insist on the 1921 border, thereby missing his last opportunity. This entire story proves that the belief that the Polish issue was exacerbated only after Truman entered the White House conflicts with the facts. The departure from the Tehran agreement on Poland was evident earlier.

Implementation of Decisions

The Western Allies also avoided the strict fulfillment of the agreement to turn part of the captured Italian fleet over to the Soviet Union. We were supposed to receive three of these ships at the end of January 1944, but difficulties arose immediately. Churchill insisted that we be offered fewer than the agreed number. Besides this, the U.S. chiefs of staff objected in general to the transfer of Italian warships because they felt that this could have a negative effect on military operations. What if the Italian sailors who had come over to the Allies' side after Italy withdrew from the war were still "collaborating"? The possibility of acts of subversion and sabotage on the ships intended for the Soviet Union could not be excluded.⁸

As a result, the USSR did not receive the Italian ships, which were the most advanced ships at that time. Instead, we were given a few old British and American ships.⁹

Another promise President Roosevelt had made at the Tehran conference was also broken. He had promised to help the Soviet Union repair the ravages of war. In talks with Stalin, the President repeated several times that this was the United States' sacred duty in view of the sacrifices its courageous Soviet ally had made. There was talk of a loan of 8-10 billion dollars with interest of 2-2.5 percent per annum and with the deferment of payments for 35 years. Then U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau wrote a special memorandum to this effect, but Roosevelt did not have time to approve it, and his successor, President Truman, who was responsible for the abrupt shift from cooperation to confrontation in national policy, did not even want to hear about helping the communists. American dollars were mainly used to help the anti-Hitler coalition's former enemies—West Germany and Japan—whose potential Washington hoped to use against the Soviet Union.

The discussions by American and English politicians of the unity of the three great powers in the war years and the postwar period also require more objective analysis. As long as the war was going on, the United States and Great Britain were extremely interested in the Soviet Ally—and not only in Europe, but also in the Far East. Washington made a great effort to draw the USSR into the war against Japan as early as possible. Furthermore, there was the frank admission that this would save over a million American lives. The Soviet losses there, it goes without saying, did not disturb anyone very much.

During one of his conversations with Stalin in Tehran, President Roosevelt expressed his views on the structure and functions of the peacekeeping organization. "It will consist," the President speculated, "of 35 or perhaps 50 united nations and will make recommendations." In Roosevelt's opinion, in addition to an executive committee, the organization should have a "police committee"—i.e., a committee made up of the United States, USSR, Great Britain, and China to oversee peacekeeping efforts.¹⁰

Roosevelt brought up the idea of the "four policemen" several times. At first it seemed to be based on the equality of the four powers, but in reality this was not the case. At that time the work on the atomic bomb project was already in full swing in the United States. Ruling circles in Washington hoped to use the bomb not only to hasten the surrender of Japan, but also to intimidate other countries and secure a dominant position for the United States in the postwar world. The work on the bomb was conducted in the deepest secrecy. During talks at Hyde Park, the President's estate, Roosevelt and Churchill made a special decision to keep the bomb a secret, "especially from the Russians."¹¹ In all of the talk about the "four policemen," there was always the implication that only two—the United States and England—would have atomic weapons.

The Western Allies also applied the double standard to postwar reconstruction. This was clearly demonstrated during the conference in Dumbarton Oaks (Washington) in fall 1944, when the charter of the international peacekeeping organization was being drafted. During the discussion of voting rights in the Security Council, the American and English delegations submitted a proposal contrary to the agreement reached in Tehran on the need to base postwar cooperation on the principle of the unity of the great powers: In the event of a dispute, any side involved in it would not have a vote. As a result, in the case of problems affecting the interests of the Soviet Union directly, the four other permanent members of the Security Council—the United States, England, China, and France—would have a chance to force their own will on the USSR. Although the Western powers envisaged the same procedure for themselves, it was clear that the capitalist countries could easily secure their interests because they had an automatic majority vote at that time, while the Soviet Union was in an unfair position. Moscow naturally rejected this proposal, and eventually a procedure was worked out to allow all permanent members of the Security Council to exercise veto power in certain cases.

In spite of all this, the Tehran conference, as the first summit meeting of the leaders of states belonging to different social systems, occupied an important place in history. Objectively, its results signified acknowledgment of the Soviet Union's role in international affairs and its increasing influence in the world arena.

Stalin's Role

Many hopes for the future were associated with the Tehran conference, especially because of the unique atmosphere of cooperation and even of mutual confidence that prevailed there. Stalin mobilized all of his remarkable acting abilities to charm Roosevelt at their first meeting in the same way that he had once charmed R. Rolland, H.G. Wells, H. Barbusse, G.B. Shaw, and L. Feuchtwanger. And we must admit that he succeeded.

Tehran paved the way for the subsequent wartime conferences in Yalta and Potsdam. In Yalta, where Roosevelt's presence still made an atmosphere of cooperation and a search for mutually acceptable decisions possible, agreements were reached on measures with a direct effect on the postwar order. In Potsdam the United States was already being represented by President Truman, and this was the site of the first signs of future confrontations and conflicts. As the American President admitted, however, the force of inertia compelled him to reach some agreements with the Soviet Union against his will.

When we sum up the results of all three conferences, we must admit that they gave our country much by laying the basis for its postwar status as a great world power. Stalin saw to it that his opinions were given the proper consideration not only by Roosevelt, but even by Churchill and Truman to some extent, and he did this under conditions that were not too advantageous for the USSR.

Our country emerged from the war with grave losses: 20 million killed, millions crippled, horrifying destruction on a huge scale from the Bug to the Volga, a devastated agricultural sector, and a deformed economy. It is true that the Red Army was still a powerful force, but even its personnel were yearning for peace after experiencing the horrors of war. The United States, on the other hand, had grown even richer during the war. It had suffered relatively small human losses and it had a strong industrial base, efficient agriculture, and the main thing—the atom bomb. The balance of power was clearly not in our favor. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union gained much in the West and the East. Truman's attempt at atomic blackmail in Potsdam was a failure. One of the main reasons was the "aura of strength" surrounding the figure of Stalin, and it seems to me that this stifled his Western partners' wishes for a serious confrontation.

We remember how Churchill, the proud descendant of the dukes of Marlborough, asked Stalin, late one night when coffee and cognac were being served after a banquet in the Kremlin, to forgive him for his part in the intervention. There have been many cases in history in which incontestable authority, however ruthlessly it may have been won, has engendered blind obedience. Is it possible that this is why Stalin still has many admirers in our country and abroad today, even after the truth about his bloody reign of terror has come to light?

After leaving Berlin, Truman told his advisers he had no intention of ever attending any more conferences like the Potsdam one. He was already firmly committed to an anti-Soviet policy line. The monopoly on the atomic bomb turned the heads of Washington politicians. With its help they hoped to dictate their will to the Soviet Union and to other countries and extend American dominion to the entire world. The ideal of Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam—the ideal of postwar cooperation with the USSR—was buried. A new anticommunist crusade was announced by Churchill in March 1946 in his speech in Fulton, which was passionately applauded by President Truman. This was the beginning of the long and dangerous period of "cold war."

But are the Western leaders wholly to blame for this turn of events? It seems as though we have to share the responsibility. It is understandable that we felt it was important to have friendly neighbors beyond our western border. The negative and even hostile reaction in the West occurred when the Soviet model, with its authoritarian administrative system, forced collectivization, and even unjustified repression, was adopted in the countries of popular democracy, and not without Stalin's blessing. After all, it was not until the end of 1956, after the 20th CPSU Congress and the events in Hungary, that we recognized the right of each fraternal party to choose its own pattern of development. Actions led to reactions, and the spiral of confrontation and the arms race kept growing.

Looking into the Future

In the postwar decades several attempts were made to stop this disastrous rush toward the precipice. There were summit meetings—in Geneva and Vienna—and there were Soviet-American talks at the summit level in the 1970's—in Moscow, in Washington, again in Moscow, in Vladivostok, and in Vienna. When there was talk of the "spirit of Geneva" in 1955, it seemed to have much in common with the "spirit of Tehran"—the first meeting of the leaders of states belonging to two different social systems.

Each time, however, the hopes would give way to disillusionment. Washington would return to its anti-Soviet rhetoric and resume its attempts to achieve decisive military superiority to the USSR. This would evoke a reaction from our side and would result in a new round of the arms race. The last outburst of confrontations, referred to in political literature as the "second cold war," took place at the beginning of the 1980's when the Republican administration entered the White House, but the total futility of this new confrontational line was already apparent by the middle of this decade.

The principles of the new way of thinking in international affairs were formulated at the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and later at the 27th party congress. The USSR made important peace

initiatives, put forth new ideas in the sphere of international security, and proposed the gradual reduction of nuclear weapons and their complete elimination by the year 2000. Washington had to respond to Moscow's challenge. The Geneva summit meeting in 1985 was followed by a series of intensive talks by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan, in Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow—four summits in less than 3 years!

The summit meeting in Washington last year was marked by the signing of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The meeting in Moscow, where INF Treaty ratification documents were exchanged, paved the way to a nuclear-free world. It also recorded serious advances in the negotiation of the agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive arms by 50 percent with the observance of the ABM Treaty. The Moscow meeting also provided strong momentum for progress in bilateral Soviet-American dialogue.

There is every reason to hope for the irreversibility of this process. Many factors are at work here: the realization of the impossibility of nuclear war, the acknowledgement of the ecological threat, and the aggravation of problems in North-South relations. An especially significant factor, however, is the involvement of increasing broad segments of the public—millions and millions of people—in the policymaking process. The United Nations has been more active. There are broader exchanges between the American and Soviet people, and they have new opportunities to learn more about each other's lives. The "enemy image" is fading and the myth of the "Soviet threat" is falling into decay.

It is obvious, however, that the opponents of normal international relations have not laid down their arms. They use any excuse to impede the movement toward a nuclear-free world. They have already been able to stop the talks on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. It will take considerable effort to surmount this resistance, exorcise the phantoms of fear and enmity, and make relations between nations healthy, productive, and predictable. Then the dreams of lasting peace, which came into being 45 years ago at the time of the Tehran conference, can finally come true.

Footnotes

1. "Sovetskiy Soyuz na mezhdunarodnykh konferentsiyakh perioda Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945. Tegeranskaya konferentsiya trekh soyuznykh derzhav—SSSR, SShA i Velikobritaniya (28 noyabrya-1 dekabrya 1943)," [The Soviet Union in International Conferences During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. The Tehran Conference of the Leaders of the Three Allied Powers—the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain (28 November-1 December 1943)], Moscow, 1984, p 157.

2. J. Burns, "Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom, 1940-1945," New York, 1970, p 374.

3. M. Marloff, "Strategy for Coalition Warfare: 1943-44," Washington, 1953, pp 68-69.

4. H. Stimson and M. Bundy, "On Active Service in Peace and War," New York, 1947, p 527.

5. "FRUS. The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943," Washington, 1961, pp 254-259.

6. "Tegeranskaya konferentsiya....," p 150. This referred to part of East Prussia. Koenigsberg (Kaliningrad) and its environs later became part of the USSR.

7. E. Rozek, "Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland," New York, 1958, pp 222-223.

8. "Churchill and Roosevelt. Correspondence," Doc. No 279, Library of Congress, pp 412-413.

9. "Perepiska predsdatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR s prezidentami SShA i premyer-ministrami Velikobritanii vo vremya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg." [The Correspondence of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers with Presidents of the United States and Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], vol 1, Moscow, 1976, pp 223-251.

10. "Sovetsko-amerikanskiye otnosheniya vo vremya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg." [Soviet-American Relations During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], vol 1, Moscow, 1984, pp 446-451.

11. President's Map Room Papers, Naval Aide's File, Box 172, FDR Library, Hyde Park.

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Interstate Diplomacy Seen as Distinct from Class Struggle

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[Article by Aleksandr Borisovich Koryev, office administrator in Philosophy Department of Moscow Institute of Instrument Building: "Peaceful Coexistence: The General Social Approach"; continuation of discussion of peaceful coexistence begun in A.V. Nikiforov's article in issue No 12, 1987]

[Text] For a long time we regarded peaceful coexistence, the principle of relations between states of different social systems, as a "specific" or "special" form, "element,"¹ or "new front"² of the class struggle between

the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between socialism and capitalism. We believed that the struggle took place in the world, or international, arena.

As we know, this view of peaceful coexistence was based on the class approach to international events, in accordance with which international relations, including intergovernmental relations, are class relations.

By the same token, relations between states with opposing social structures were always portrayed in theory as antagonistic relations.

The inviolability of this interpretation of peaceful coexistence for almost three decades was, in our opinion, the main cause of stagnation in theory and errors in policy.

Now the assumption that "peaceful coexistence is a specific form of class struggle" has been recognized by the national leadership and by many social scientists as one of the most popular scientific dogmas with no relationship to peaceful coexistence.

The new political thinking which is being developed today and which assigns priority, as we know, to common human values, is, however, essentially reproducing the earlier common view of intergovernmental relations as relations of class struggle. In essence, only the modifiers are being discarded: "special form," "element," etc. The class approach still constitutes the basis of the theoretical view of international relations. It has been categorically stated, for example, that "international relations have always been class relations,"³ or that "it is a fact that the class approach to all events in social life is the alphabet of Marxism. This approach is still completely consistent with the realities of the class society, in which class interests come into conflict, and the realities of international life, which is permeated with these conflicts."⁴

Therefore, the sphere of international life, including intergovernmental relations, is still being regarded as a sphere of class relations and class struggle—or, more precisely, as a sphere of "conflicting class interests"—in spite of the priority assigned to common human values. This could quite naturally give rise to the assumption that the new thinking is new because the political thrust of the class struggle in the international arena has changed and is now assigning priority to common human interests and values. Is this not what the authoritative expert was saying: "In fact, even for the working class today, the struggle for common human interests coincides with the struggle for class interests"⁵? A new definition of peaceful coexistence could probably be based on these views; namely, that peaceful coexistence is not a form of class struggle, but a battle of class interests for common human values. It would be difficult to subscribe to this interpretation of peaceful coexistence.

At this time there are two apparent positions on the bases of the theory of intergovernmental relations and the policy of peaceful coexistence, which are distinguished by differing scales of application of the class approach. Both probably influence the elaboration of foreign policy concepts, particularly long-range plans.

The first does not deny the significance of the class approach to the analysis of relations within countries but regards relations between states as non-class relations, external to each state.⁶ The main research objective in line with this position is the search for constructive approaches and models of a safe world under the conditions of the unequal development of countries. For the advocates of this position the unequal development of countries is the historical and logical point of departure for peaceful coexistence.

The second position is that intergovernmental relations are also class relations. The main objective in line with this position is the search for reasonable grounds for a class approach to contemporary international relations. For this reason, it acknowledges ideological compromises (balance of interests) in addition to political compromises (balance of power), and this seriously discredits the theory of class struggle.

The heuristic (and common human) significance of the first position is obvious. The interests of our foreign policy and ideology would seem to demand its further development and clarification.

The fundamental shortcoming of the second position is the absolutization (excessive augmentation of the sphere of application) of the class approach, its application "to all events in social life," which certainly cannot provide an accurate view of intergovernmental relations (and not only intergovernmental ones). How is this manifested? We will look at some examples.

In the article "The Leninist Concept of Peaceful Coexistence and the Realities of Our Day," D.G. Tomashevskiy directs the reader's attention to the appearance of a "fundamentally" new situation in international relations after the victory of Great October, when "a state in which power belonged to the laboring public instead of to the exploitative classes became their subject for the first time in history" and concludes that "the basic class conflict of the era—between labor and capital and between the working class and the bourgeoisie—was extended directly to the sphere of intergovernmental relations in this way." The author's train of thought led him to the assumption of the existence of the "antagonism of two systems" in the international arena: socialism (labor and the working class) and capitalism (capital and the bourgeoisie).⁷

West German researcher B. Griener theorizes along the same lines: "The central event in the history of contemporary international relations is the October Socialist Revolution of 1917. After the tsarist regime had been

overthrown and the Bolsheviks took power, the antagonism which had existed on the internal political level between labor and capital and between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie moved to the sphere of international and intergovernmental relations." He then goes on to say that "the class struggle on the national and international levels has been marked since that time by conflicts between different social systems."⁸

In this line of reasoning the class conflict "between labor and capital," which is known to reflect the production and economic relations of the bourgeois nation, is directly and mechanically extended to the political system of international relations—or, more precisely, to part of this system, intergovernmental relations—which is impermissible from the standpoint of dialectical logic, as we know, without consideration for the distinctive features of each sphere: the basis and superstructure, the national and international spheres, the internal and intergovernmental spheres. This line of reasoning ignores the relative autonomy of intergovernmental relations. As a result, relations between states with different social structures are viewed as relations directly between classes, and the conflicts between them are analyzed accordingly as antagonistic, with all of the ensuing theoretical conclusions. For example: "The scientific view of the world...is based on the analysis of the correlation and struggle of class forces within capitalism and between socialism and capitalism."⁹

Intergovernmental relations, however, represent a sphere of social relations which is not formed by the actions of classes directly, but by the actions of states, and the distinctive features of these relations stem from the distinctive features of states as public administration systems.

We know that the state, which took the place of the tribal order's administrative bodies, is a historically determined form of public administration with an essentially political content. One of its salient features is the presence of public authority in the society—i.e., authority exercised by a specific group of people "who are singled out to govern others and to exercise systematic and constant control of a specific set of constraints in the interest and for the purpose of administration."¹⁰ Consequently, in the first place, the main political feature of the state is its public nature. In the second place, sovereignty—and this is also a well-known fact—is a legal feature of the state. In the third place, because one of the economic characteristics of the state is the autonomy of public authority, based on taxes or loans, then autonomy must be its distinctive economic feature. In the fourth place, because the social characteristics of the state depend on the position occupied by public authority in the society and because this is a position of leadership, then leadership is a social feature of the state. In the fifth place, the moral characteristics of the state, which exist, for example, in the laws of any state or in diplomatic protocol, consist in the dignity and integrity of public authority; consequently, its moral features are

the same. In the sixth place, because the national characteristics of the state depend on the characteristics of the nationality—its relative historical stability and, consequently, its relative independence of the outside world—the national features of the state are its relative stability and independence.

By their nature, all of these features of the state are systemic and integrative, stemming from the unity (or interconnection) of all facets of life in a historically determined social developmental form (the race or nationality). This is why all of them differ significantly from the distinctive features of the different elements of the state: political, legal, economic, and other features of classes, the ethnic and demographic makeup of the population, the geographic features of the territory, etc. This description of the features of the state is based on the belief that it is an integral and comprehensive entity: The state does not exist outside a certain changing set of elements, but, by the same token, it cannot be equated with only part of them or one of them—classes, race, territory; the state has other features inherent in it as an entity—administrative features. It is particularly significant that all of these features of the state are essentially not class features, but general social features, and that each and all of them reflect the common historical essence of the state, its interests, its purposes, and its functions—public administration.

To perform its administrative functions, the state objectively, regardless of its class content or class affiliations, needs external safety. The guarantee of safe administration is the primary concern of any state—socialist or capitalist. These are the common features that put all states in the same position, a position of equality in relation to one another, in spite of internal differences. In addition to needing safety, the state has an objective need for stable and dynamic administration, flexibility and mobility, reliability and effectiveness, but the main thing the state needs is information, which constitutes the basis of administration. "Information is the mother of administration," N. Weiner said.

During the process of interaction, states enter into intergovernmental, essentially administrative, relations, and not class relations, and it is here that they implement their own, primarily governmental, interests, goals, and functions. For this reason, the belief that intergovernmental relations are class relations, not to mention the view of these relations as a special form or new front of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, is a mistake with potentially serious theoretical and political consequences. Regrettably, this has happened: Our military leaders frequently outpaced our diplomats, and diplomacy became less vigorous and lost its flexibility. This sometimes reached the point of the severance of diplomatic relations and the absolute refusal to negotiate, and for reasons that were far from diplomatic. Even the fact that the loss of contact meant that we were depriving ourselves of the initiative and the ability to influence the situation in some way was ignored.

All of the abovementioned general social features of the state and the numerous conditions of its functioning as a system of administration give rise to the most important social (and not class) principles of relations between states, essentially principles of organization and administration,¹¹ the main one of which is the principle of equality—the equality of relations.

By their very nature, intergovernmental relations represent a structure of social development¹² with its own distinctive features¹³, differing from class relations. They make up a relatively autonomous sphere of social relations, autonomous in the sense that this sphere has its own logical patterns, differing from the logical patterns of class relations and class struggle. The autonomy is relative because intergovernmental relations and class relations (within countries) are dialectically interconnected—i.e., this interconnection is mediated by the effects of a multitude of factors and conditions, primarily the actions of states and their governments. "We cannot ignore governments," V.I. Lenin said in the "Report on Peace," "because this would delay possibilities for concluding a peace treaty."¹⁴ Intergovernmental relations are a different level of political organization, higher than class relations within countries, a level marked by a higher level of administration. For this reason, relations between states cannot be class relations, neither antagonistic nor non-antagonistic; they can only be general social relations, essentially governmental administrative relations. Each state in relation to another state does not represent its opposite, as the feudal lord to the serf or the bourgeoisie to the proletariat, but the external sphere of its activity, and this radically changes the research situation in the theory of international relations and substantially affects the choice of methods of studying and analyzing them and also affects practices—the choice of political means of their regulation.

In line with this position, the specific features distinguishing intergovernmental relations from the relations of class struggle are the following. Whereas the political goal of class struggle is the assumption of power by one class or another, the political goal of intergovernmental relations is the security of states. The security of states is also a logical pattern in the development of intergovernmental relations, but just as any historical pattern, it takes the form of a tendency. Whereas the economic goal of the struggle of classes is, for example, the improvement of financial status and working conditions for the working class and the derivation of profit from the more intense exploitation of the working class for the bourgeoisie, the economic goal of intergovernmental relations is mutual advantage. This is also a logical pattern. Whereas the legal (or judicial) goal of class struggle is the enactment of state laws reflecting the will of the class, the legal goal of intergovernmental relations is the mutually acceptable decision (or agreement). This is a logical pattern. Whereas classes are irreconcilable in the ideological struggle, states need mutual understanding. This is also a logical pattern. Whereas certain information is

confidential in the political struggle of classes and the direct political contacts between the parties of opposing classes are limited, for states, as G. Shultz accurately pointed out, "the openness of ideas, information, and contacts is a guarantee of success."¹⁵

All of this suggests that the essence of intergovernmental relations consists in the interaction of states for the organization of their relations and the administration of the external sphere of activity by each. It is clear that intergovernmental relations, in contrast to class relations, are mutual. For this reason, other important principles of the organization of relations by states and standards of administration are the principles of equal and mutual relations—i.e., the principles of mutuality, joint action, and coordination, including equal security. The role of states in the process of joint, coordinated administration can vary. The principle of mutuality also defines the functions of intergovernmental administration: the search for compatible goals of administration and mutually acceptable decisions, the organization of joint performance and reciprocal control, etc.

The two main, and most common, methods of the political administration of external spheres of activity by states are war and peace, and they dictate the choice of means of administration (forcible or peaceful) and determine the status, position, and nature of intergovernmental relations—relations of war or peace.

All of this allows us to formulate our own definition of the policy of peaceful coexistence. Peaceful coexistence is a universal international, external policy of organization and administration, conducted by states by peaceful means on a mutual basis with the aim of securing normal external conditions for the existence and development of states. Normal conditions are those corresponding to the standards of administration—universality (or equality) and mutuality. Normal political conditions are, above all, security, and also stability, reliability, and others; normal economic conditions are the effectiveness and profitability of possible contacts; normal moral conditions (the international moral climate) are respect, trust, responsibility, etc.

This interpretation of the policy of peaceful coexistence does not exclude the possibility of intervention by states in one another's internal affairs in the event, for example, of a real threat to their own security. This is why diplomacy exists. The process by which the USSR and United States arrived at the INF Treaty is a specific example of this view of peaceful coexistence. It encompassed all facets and stages of the administrative cycle: from the display of mutual interest (the reduction of threats to security) and the elaboration of a common goal (the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles) through the submission of necessary and sufficient information to the resolution of problems connected

with reciprocal verification and mutual on-site inspections. It is possible that many global problems will require joint resolution in the future and, consequently, mutual intervention by states in spheres once regarded as strictly internal.

Therefore, the consistent application of the thesis regarding the priority of common human values in the policy of peaceful coexistence is incompatible with the thesis of class confrontation in the international arena in any of its "forms," "elements," or "interests." Otherwise, the conceptual basis of peaceful coexistence would be logically inadequate and would therefore allow for extreme rightist and leftist interpretations.

We should recall Lenin's explanation: "From the standpoint of basic Marxist ideals, the interests of social development are higher than the interests of the proletariat,"¹⁶ and this means they are higher than the interests of its class struggle. If we adhere consistently to the class approach in investigations and assessments of international relations and in foreign policy, without absolutizing it, we have to recognize the sphere of intergovernmental relations as a general social sphere and not as a class sphere. This is certainly not a total rejection of the class approach, but it does objectively restrict its application to the sphere of relations within countries. There is no question that processes of differentiation and integration exist in international relations, but their criteria are not the same as in class relations.

Whereas the class approach presupposes the recognition of the correlation of class forces as the main factor in the development of intergovernmental relations,¹⁷ the general social approach would see the main factor as the degree and level of collective administration of the community of states.

The general social approach allows us to formulate a new definition of diplomacy, differing from the standard interpretation. The absolutization of the class approach gave rise to the common opinion that diplomacy is of a strictly class nature. This seems incorrect. Diplomacy is of a strictly governmental nature, and it is characterized primarily by the features of the state, including the features of the bureaucracy, regardless of the class interests and goals of its members. Diplomacy, including ceremonial procedure, and protocol are of a general social nature, and not a class nature (national in form, political and economic in content, and administrative in essence). We can say the same thing about diplomacy that V.I. Lenin said about policy: "Policy (read, diplomacy—A.K.) has its own objective logic, regardless of the plans of specific individuals or parties."¹⁸ The ascription of certain features to diplomacy that are characteristic of classes and not of diplomacy, and the assignment of functions to diplomacy that are actually class functions considerably limit its maneuvering ability and ultimately cause it to lose what can only be described as its diplomatic nature. We should recall that in the state interests of the Soviet regime (the interests of

administration),¹⁹ and for the sake of its preservation, consolidation, and development, the Soviet Government made the only correct diplomatic choice after the arduous intra- and inter-party struggle in 1918: It decided to sign the Treaty of Brest, sacrificing some state interests, but not the main one—the administration of the young Soviet Republic. The position of the "leftist communists" was the opposite and was essentially subjectivist. In the class interests of the proletariat, and not in the interests of the state, sacrificing both the proletariat and the Soviet regime, they proposed the continuation of the war in 1918, because they assumed it was a revolutionary war. The fundamental error of the "leftists," an error whose psychological basis consisted of the class ambitions of some political leaders of the victorious proletariat, was their inclination to ignore the objective external conditions of the state's existence, and to ignore professional diplomacy at the same time.

From the standpoint of the general social approach, diplomacy is not passive representation, but vigorous and creative activity for the organization and administration of intergovernmental relations. The diplomat is the organizer of international cooperation and the administrator of the state's external affairs. Within the framework of this definition of diplomacy, its main function is the elaboration and implementation of models and programs for the organization and administration of joint and coordinated activity by states.

Footnotes

1. A.O. Chubaryan, "Mirnoye sosushchestvovaniye: teoriya i praktika" [Peaceful Coexistence: Theory and Practice], Moscow, 1976, p 56.
2. "Kratkiy politicheskiy slovar" [Concise Political Dictionary], 4th ed., suppl, Moscow, 1987, p 178.
3. KOMMUNIST, 1988, No 11, p 110.
4. GLOBUS, 1988, No 6, p 4.
5. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, 1988, No 8, p 24.
6. MEMO, 1988, No 5, pp 4-15.
7. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1986, No 4, pp 4, 9.
8. B. Griener, "American Foreign Policy from Truman to Our Day," Moscow, 1986, p 16.
9. S.A. Tyushkevich, "Filosofiya i voyennaya teoriya" [Philosophy and Military Theory], Moscow, 1975, p 290.
10. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 39, p 69.

11. The principles of the organization of relations between interacting states are acquiring the status of administrative standards.

12. This distinction was also drawn in Marxism. Engels defined the contradictory relations between classes within states as relations of "class struggle," but he called the same kind of relations between the states of that time "competition for conquests" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 21, p 171).

13. For example, a distinctive feature of the development of intergovernmental relations is the absence of a "central nucleus of authority and administration" in international life (Yu. Kukulka, "Problemy teorii mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy" [Aspects of International Relations Theory], Moscow, 1980, p 21).

14. V.I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 35, p 16.

15. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, 1988, No 8, p 16.

16. V.I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 4, p 220.

17. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, 1975, No 4, pp 102, 104.

18. V.I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 14, p 190.

19. Ibid., vol 36, pp 167-173.

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Class Struggle in U.S.-Soviet Relations

18030005e Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 88 (signed to press 24 Oct 88) pp 53-59

[Article by Yuriy Aleksandrovich Zamoshkin, doctor of philosophical sciences and chief scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "An Inquiry into the Use of the Concept of Class Antagonism in Examinations of Soviet-American Relations"]

[Text] One of the main topics of discussion in A.V. Nikiforov's interesting article is a question which may not be new, but is still relevant, and might even be more relevant today: Can the relations between states, associated with the distinction between capitalism and socialism, not only resemble relations between classes—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat—but also be viewed as a projection or direct expression of the latter?

Both A.V. Nikiforov and A.B. Koryev, who has argued against some of Nikiforov's views, have a negative reply to this question. And I agree with them, but this agreement does not preclude possible differences in the approach to this issue and to the methods of its resolution. Besides this, the question is also answered in the

affirmative in many works in our literature. The differences in approaches to the issue and its relevance at a time of perestroika in ideology and foreign policy are the reasons I also felt the need to take part in this discussion.

Proceeding from the line of reasoning employed in the classic works of Marxism, we could probably cite the following basic objections to the identification of relations between classes—the bourgeoisie and proletariat—with the relations between states representing different systems—capitalist and socialist.

In the first place, the conflicts between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat stem from the unique nature of the interrelationship of these classes. The bourgeoisie's ownership of the means of production and the proletariat's lack of ownership rights directly and necessarily attach the proletariat to the bourgeoisie and turn it into the object of exploitation. Within the framework of this reciprocal connection, relations between the two classes are viewed as relations of domination and submission. States like the USSR and the United States, however, are equally sovereign in relation to one another. Although contemporary world history has made them objectively interdependent, this interdependence is of a fundamentally different type than the interdependence of the proletariat and bourgeoisie. Neither of these states is the object of exploitation by the other, and there are no relations of domination and submission between them.

In the second place, in accordance with the same traditional Marxist line of reasoning, the bourgeoisie does not constitute the majority of the population in the state defined as "bourgeois." All citizens, including those belonging to the working class and various strata of the laboring public, have an interest in the future of the state, in its well-being, and in national security. These strata do constitute the overwhelming majority of the national population. For this reason, the state regarding itself as the protector of the interests of the working class and all laborers cannot treat the other state or its interests as if its population consisted only of the bourgeoisie. It cannot build a relationship with this state on the basis of the principles by which the exploited and submissive class should be guided in its relations with the class exploiting and oppressing it.¹

In the third place, according to the Marxist line of reasoning, free of primitive and vulgar interpretations, the state functions and develops as a relatively autonomous entity in relation to classes, which represent the main elements of the social structure. The state is relatively autonomous in relation to the economically dominant class, if only because it contains different groups supporting different political organizations and expressing different points of view, including views on foreign and military policy. States are only relatively autonomous because they feel the pressure of other classes and social strata and of the mass movements associated with them. The level of development of

democratic procedures in politics secures a certain level of pressure. The growth of mass movements can change the state's military and foreign policy.

The policy of states frequently also embodies distinctive features of the country's history, cultural traditions, including the traditions of the political culture, national consciousness, and national mentality. This also includes various habits, inclinations, attitudes, lines of reasoning, and personality categories. The activity of states depends on the changing correlation of forces and trends in the political sphere and the ideological sphere, on spontaneous changes in the political and ideological climate, in public opinion, and in the mental state of the society. This activity also depends on the attitudes, views, and character traits of leaders, on their inclination to make doctrinaire ideological declarations or, conversely, their ability to see and assess new problems realistically; changes in the country, in other countries, and in the entire world; historical imperatives and the requirements of the development of human civilization. Finally, the activity of a state and its military and foreign policy, revealing its attitude toward another state, depend largely on the actual behavior of this other state, on the ideological principles and precepts it declares or practices, on the correlation of apparent trends within the state and, finally, on the state of international relations in general.

History attests to the possibility of the development of Soviet-American relations in different directions, to alternative options of development. A comparison of these relations in the first half of the 1940's and then in the late 1940's and the 1950's provides sufficient evidence of this. A comparison of the early 1980's and the last 2 years reveals this possibility even more clearly. Today there is a real dilemma: the continuation of the arms race, the escalation of tension, and the growing threat of nuclear disaster and the annihilation not only of the United States and USSR but of all humanity, or movement in the direction of nuclear and conventional arms reduction, the conclusion of mutually acceptable agreements, and the development of mutually beneficial cooperation. This is why a historically concrete, multidimensional, and objective analysis—free of ideological dogmatism and primitive thinking—of states as subjects of intergovernmental relations, an analysis of the complex set of circumstances, preconditions, and factors influencing the choice of alternative policy lines and consistency in their implementation, is so important today. Within the framework of this analysis, a prominent place must be reserved for concrete investigations of the real dynamics of the development of the social system the state represents, the social and class structure of the system, the actual relations between classes, and the influence they actually exert on the ideology and activity of the state.

I must say I am disturbed by the fact that the term "class interest" in the international arena is frequently divested of its specific historical content in our literature and in

many of our statements and is used as an ideological stereotype with a purely symbolic meaning, or simply as a synonym for the interest of a specific state. In both cases the term could promote the ideologization of intergovernmental relations and impede a strictly realistic view of them and a thorough understanding of the complex and often contradictory relationship between classes and government institutions in politics.

A firm belief in the special importance of this kind of concrete historical, multidimensional analysis, meeting the requirements of realism, compels me to be somewhat wary of works in which the emphasis in discussions of intergovernmental relations is on the postulation of certain common, so to speak, attributes of states as subjects of these relations. I will not conceal the apprehension I felt when I read the sections of A.B. Koryev's article in which he lists the common attributes of states and includes not only their sovereignty and independence, but also "dignity and integrity." In my life I have seen several examples of behavior by states in the international arena which could never meet the requirements of integrity or dignity. Furthermore, some of the states in the sovereign and independent category were far from such in reality, and this naturally affected their relations with other states. For this reason, in spite of my respect for the human brain's capacity for abstract thinking and ability to construct common standards, categorical imperatives, and ideal models, I am resolutely in favor of the coordination of the results of this thinking with the results of a concrete analysis of concrete states and their behavior in concrete historical situations.

I could not help thinking of the importance of this kind of coordination when I read A.B. Koryev's assertions that "relations between states...can only be general social relations" or that "the most important principles of the organization of relations by states...are the principles of equality and mutuality...including equal security." This, as the saying goes, is "too good to be true."

It seems to me, however, that this is an example of the substitution of an ideal model for the extremely contradictory realities of intergovernmental relations, a case of confusing what should be with what is. These sins, unfortunately, are quite typical of our social sciences. History, including current events, proves that states engaged in real intergovernmental relations can display interests which are not of a general social nature, but which embody the private interests of certain groups, including the interests of authoritarian, bureaucratic, and undemocratic government institutions and structures. Intergovernmental relations can include displays of national egoism, contempt for the interests of other countries, hegemonic and imperious ambitions, militaristic attitudes, aggressive impulses, and ideological biases precluding mutual understanding, the search for mutually acceptable agreements, and political realism in general. These relations, however, can also reveal other—opposite—interests, ambitions, inclinations, and attitudes.

When we try to answer the question about the possibility of examining relations between the United States and the USSR by analogy with relations between the bourgeois class and the proletarian class, the interpretation of relations between these states and the view of class relations are of tremendous importance.

Here I want to direct the reader's attention to an extremely interesting fact. Even authors who deny the validity of equating conflicts between such states as the USSR and the United States with conflicts between the proletariat and bourgeoisie within a state of the bourgeois category, even they are frequently inclined to describe the latter primarily with the aid of the concept of antagonism. For example, A.V. Nikiforov defines the conflicts between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, stressing that the interests of these classes are "mutually exclusive," that the "struggle between them reaches the point of acute conflict," and that he therefore believes that the concept of antagonism can be applied to their relations today ("just as it could 70 years ago"). And it is true that when relations between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are described in our literature, the main concept and, what is most important, the commonly acknowledged concept is the concept of antagonism, usually signifying the mutually exclusive interests of classes, and the tendency of their relations to develop in only one direction—in the direction of struggle, reaching the point of acute conflict and leading unavoidably to confrontation.

The same interpretation of the concept of class antagonism, but in a much more precise, insistent, and categorical manner, is displayed by those who are inclined to apply this concept to the relations of states representing socialism and capitalism, and primarily to relations between the USSR and the United States. The concept of class antagonism plays a special role in the works by these authors. It is essentially an instrument for the expression and validation of their belief that the new thinking is inapplicable to national security and to military and foreign policy issues, their profoundly skeptical feelings about the possibility and expediency of reasonable reductions of nuclear and conventional arms and of the de-ideologization of USSR-U.S. relations, about the permissibility of concluding agreements involving compromises and concessions and, finally, about the acknowledgement of the common and compatible interests of the two countries and the possibility of cooperation on this basis.

Proceeding from the special ideological significance of the concept of class antagonism in the substantiation of the views listed above, I would like to subject the concept itself to a special investigation. In this connection, I will ask the main question, which is, I admit, a difficult one: Can the contradictory relations between the bourgeoisie and the working class today be described only with the aid of the concept of class antagonism in the traditional sense? It seems to me that the facts of 20th century history—before World War II and especially after it (I

am not referring to isolated facts, but to the total group)—indicate a wide variety of forms of relations between workers and employers in the United States and other Western countries. For example, social development there is always accompanied by strikes. Some strikes are distinguished by considerable intensity, sizable dimensions, and the presence of political demands. All strikes, however, end sooner or later, and they frequently result in some kind of compromise, so that the new collective contract takes the demands of the striking workers and the owners or managers of enterprises into account to some extent (widely varying, of course).

The tendency to reach compromise decisions as a result of many strikes and to record them in contracts which both sides will sign and will fulfill to some extent—at least until new conflicts and new strikes occur—this tendency can be seen throughout contemporary history. I personally do not know of any conclusive (and representative) data which would testify that this tendency is disappearing or growing noticeably weaker, although it naturally appears stronger at times.

Besides this, it seems to me that there is no evidence of any real consolidation of the opposite tendency—toward the exacerbation of class conflicts and toward the workers' realization of the impossibility of improving their position in the existing society, although there are certainly many strikes which leave their participants feeling that they did not gain anything at all after the strikes are over.

In any case, both tendencies can be seen in real life, but the concept of class antagonism applies to only one of them, and often only in absolute form, reflecting more wishes than realities.

In the history of the United States we can find periods when more vigorous activity by the labor movement for the rights of workers and the improvement of the quality of their life stimulated fairly extensive social reforms. This applies, for example, to F. Roosevelt's "New Deal," J. Kennedy's "New Frontiers," and L. Johnson's "Great Society." We can also see periods in U.S. history, however, of attacks on the rights and gains of labor (the early 1980's, for example). In the history of the United States, in the real mass consciousness and behavior of the population strata we must include in the working class, we find evidence of the conflicting, contradictory interests of labor and capital, but we also find substantial evidence of the actual compatibility of certain interests, if, of course, we are speaking of the interests motivating the actual behavior of the sides and their specific actions in the economic and political sphere. For example, we are constantly encountering cases in which the behavior of hired workers and employees attests to their direct interest in preventing the bankruptcy of the enterprise where they work and, what is more, in securing its economic welfare under the conditions of fierce competition. This interest, furthermore, is revealed more

clearly when economic conditions in the country deteriorate and competition in world markets grows stronger, and the periodic appearance of these situations could probably be regarded as an extremely characteristic tendency of the contemporary period of history we have witnessed.

Sizable segments of the working class are also displaying an interest in improving the overall state of the economy in the country as a whole, in accelerating economic growth, and in accomplishing the scientific and technical renovation of industry. Although this renovation generally poses the real threat of unemployment for some workers and employees, most of the working class usually supports the closure of factories with obsolete equipment and the establishment of fundamentally new forms of production, even if this presupposes functional unemployment (the split in the working class in England during the long and intense miners' strike provides sufficient proof of this).

In my opinion, all of these facts, proving that the interests of workers and employers are compatible, cannot be the result of the mere pressure the bourgeois consciousness exerts on the worker consciousness and subtle mind control, although this pressure and subtle manipulation do exist. In any case, regardless of how we explain these facts, we cannot ignore their steady and constant presence in social practice and their practical political significance, at least in the United States, the West European countries, Japan, etc.

Besides this, I personally believe that the functioning of the complex social and economic systems that took shape on the contemporary level of the development of civilization, in spite of their differences, presuppose the common interest of the entire population, all strata and groups, in the development of social benefits and services of various types—for example, better systems of education, medicine, social hygiene, transportation, communications, culture, and mechanisms for the resolution of increasingly severe ecological and other problems, not to mention the problems of national security and the guarantee of peace. Of course, this common interest does not exclude the possibility of opposing points of view, their polarization, and the emergence of conflicts. The interests of different classes, population strata, and groups can be revealed in these conflicts, but the conflicts and the main thing—the real directions of their development and resolution—cannot be explained only with the aid of the concept of class antagonism.

In the actually verifiable relations of classes (i.e., in the relations in which they act as groups whose behavior in the economic and political sphere and whose opinions can be detected, described, and measured with the tools of concrete social research and observation), we encounter a colossal variety of situations, the possibility of choosing different specific alternatives, the effects of different tendencies, and the struggle between them. It seems to me that when we are discussing not general and

abstract-theoretical futurological schemes, but the actual political processes we encounter today and will probably encounter in the foreseeable future when we plan our foreign policy, we can hardly proceed from the assumption of the inevitability of clashes and total confrontation (in the United States, in any case) between the bourgeois class and the proletarian class, representing integral and politically organized groups or associations. But after all, those who employ the concept of class antagonism to explain relations between the USSR and the United States and to assess the prospects for these relations are apparently proceeding precisely from this assumption.

We have even less factual basis for the assumption of the inevitability or even the probability of a confrontation between the bourgeois class and proletarian class that would be analogous to the confrontation between the USSR and the United States during the period of "cold war" and would presuppose the accumulation and improvement of weapons as terrible as nuclear weapons or even today's conventional weapons. I, for example, can understand quite well why the idea of civil war today might frighten many members of the bourgeois class and the working class.²

But the people who equate U.S.-USSR relations with relations between the bourgeoisie and the working class and who essentially explain the confrontation between these states, the tendency toward "cold war," the ideologization of foreign policy, and the nuclear arms race with references to class antagonism are proceeding precisely from this assumption and from this understanding of the prospects for inter-class confrontation.

I am certainly not denying the value of the class approach in the analysis of intergovernmental relations or various tendencies in the ideology and the military and foreign policy of states, but only in those areas and to those degrees where this approach confirms its practical value in concrete historical research, research which is unbiased and strictly objective and is based on genuinely representative factual data. I am categorically against the replacement of this kind of research with the mere superimposition of speculative and dogmatic schemes and ideological stereotypes and clichés on contradictory reality: the reality of relations between the bourgeoisie and the working class within such countries as the United States, and the reality of the intergovernmental relations of the United States and the Soviet Union. I am definitely against the use of speculative and dogmatic schemes and ideological clichés and stereotypes as instruments of one-dimensional and tendentious portrayals of reality and as a means of focusing on, and ascribing absolute value to, any single tendency or single possibility.

This is exactly what happens when the dogmatic textbook interpretation of the concept of class antagonism is used to assign absolute value to a single possibility—the possibility of the development of USSR-U.S. relations in

the direction of antagonism, arms race escalation, and ideological confrontation, manifesting itself in "enemy images"—without being coordinated with multidimensional reality. This is precisely the procedure employed in the persistently reproduced schemes alleging that only such tendencies as militarism, imperialist motives, and attack on democracy are constant, general, and immutable attributes of capitalism in its present stage and, consequently, attributes of U.S. government policy, which is declared to be the mere embodiment and projection of capitalism.

The use of speculative schemes and ideological clichés in place of the concrete historical analysis of dynamic reality interferes, in the first place, with the disclosure and accurate assessment of the development of the new thinking in the United States and the possibility of struggle against militarism, hegemonic and imperialist ambitions, and undemocratic tendencies in the ideology and the foreign and military policy of the United States, including possibilities created and manifested by the contemporary bourgeoisie, by the contradictory set of its concrete interests.

In the second place, these schemes and clichés can interfere with the objective examination and assessment of possibilities for the appearance of militarist, hegemonic, undemocratic, and authoritarian tendencies in the ideology and the military and foreign policy of states which could never be called capitalist. As we know, these possibilities have manifested themselves to varying degrees during different stages of contemporary history.

In both cases, the substitution of speculative schemes and ideological stereotypes for concrete analysis, free of tendentious and subjective overtones, impedes the development of objective knowledge, the sober assessment of new realities and the possibilities they present, and the accomplishment of the most important political task—the unification of all forces opposing militarism, the nuclear arms race, and the excessively ideological old thinking.

Footnotes

1. Obviously, when signs of crisis in a country regarded as the epitome of capitalism cause the laboring masses to suffer, this is no reason to gloat or celebrate. The era of confrontation, however, engendered a regrettable inclination or temptation to display these emotions.

2. This is not only a matter of the improvement of lethal weapons, but also of the existence of nuclear power plants and extremely complex systems ensuring the survival of millions of people, which could easily be destroyed, resulting in a disaster of unpredictable proportions.

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Interservice Rivalry's Impact on Defense Procurement Policy

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[Article by Yu.A. Koshkin: "Conflicts in the Pentagon"]

[Text] The details of the latest Pentagon scandal are periodically splashed across the pages of American newspapers and magazines. One such scandal, connected with illegal leaks of information about Defense Department contracts, broke out this June and promised to become the most infamous scandal in Pentagon history. It turned out that in addition to the Defense Department's top contractors, high-level military agency officials were also mixed up in the scandal, and that they were the ones responsible for the trade in official secrets. Facts of this kind reflect the prevailing atmosphere of corruption and graft in the community known as the military-industrial complex.

The conflicts within the military-industrial complex in connection with Pentagon procurement policies are having a direct effect on U.S. military policy, Soviet-American relations, and the arms race. What lies at the basis of these conflicts is the competition between branches of the armed services and between different types of troops and the bureaucratic struggle waged by the "gigantic army of functionaries" in whose hands, as V.I. Lenin wrote, the "real work of management" is concentrated. The purpose of the struggle is to obtain maximum allocations for one's own agency, seize priority in the structure of the armed forces, and gain the ability to exert as much influence as possible in U.S. military policymaking. According to Harvard University researcher W. Kaufmann, the present structure of the Defense Department has been retained because of a phenomenon that was already recognized by D. Eisenhower: "The different branches of the armed forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot and, what is more, will not stop their eternal squabbling over the size of defense budgets and the goals and necessary numbers of armed forces."

Competition between different branches of the armed forces has been witnessed throughout U.S. history. The clashes between military agencies were particularly acute after World War II, when nuclear weapons made their appearance and the three departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were created. The battle for priority at that time was connected mainly with the ability to deliver nuclear weapons over strategic distances and with the creation of the maximum potential of these weapons. It was precisely at that time and precisely as a result of the competition between military agencies that the surplus potential of weapons of mass destruction was created and then was continuously built up in all subsequent decades. In an attempt to improve strategic planning, Eisenhower decided to turn the compilation of the

Single Integrated Operational Plan over to the Strategic Air Command, allowing this agency to practice the virtually uncontrolled buildup of nuclear potential and delivery means.

General M. Taylor, former Chief of Army Staff, wrote in his book "Precarious Security": "All defense programs, however different they might be, are actually competing with one another for a certain number of dollars." Each military agency solicits funds for its own programs, and preference is given to the most expensive weapons systems, whose development requires commensurate funding. All branches of the armed forces draw up long-range programs for the development of weapons portrayed as absolutely essential to the stronger defense of the United States. The Air Force, for example, is promoting the deployment of the Midgetman and MX ICBM's, the B-1B strategic bomber, and the Stealth plane, which has such a small radar echoing area that it is capable of penetrating the zone of enemy ballistic missile defense systems undetected. The Navy plans to launch nuclear submarines with Trident II missiles and to increase the number of carrier task forces to 15. The Army hopes to deploy a broad-scale ABM system.

Serious conflicts also exist within the different branches of the armed forces, such as the disagreements over the relative significance of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. This is the cause of constant disagreements between the Strategic Air Command and the Tactical Air Command of the United States. There are also conflicts within the Navy. In particular, the heads of this department have not been able to eliminate the rivalry between supporters of multipurpose submarines and aircraft carriers.

The main battle, however, is being fought by the different branches of the armed forces. An analysis of the defense budget provides a vivid picture of the conflicts in the Pentagon. Throughout the 1980's the Navy has been allocated the largest share of funding. This has been a constant tendency since 1972. The only exceptions were fiscal years 1984 and 1985, when the Air Force caught up with the Navy in total allocations. In fiscal year 1986 the Navy again ranked highest among the budget priorities of the Defense Department and Congress.

For the last 15 years the Army has invariably received the smallest share of allocations. This tendency was even more pronounced under President Reagan (see Table 1 [not reproduced]).

One of the Army's problems is that it spends much more money on salaries for its personnel (approximately 35 percent of its budget) than the two other branches of the armed forces (16 percent for the Navy and 9 percent for the Air Force). In the current fiscal year the Department of the Army received 74.5 billion dollars and had a total of 1,537,000 servicemen in the regular Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve. The Navy's budget was 29 percent greater, although the number of its personnel was 37 percent lower. The Air Force received 27 percent more

funding than the Army and had only about half as many servicemen. The main reason for this, according to American experts, is the priority of strategic weapons and research in advanced systems using the latest technology.

Whereas the distribution of total defense budget funds among the branches of the armed forces indicates current politico-military priorities, an analysis of the distribution of R&D financing indicates which politico-military programs the U.S. leadership regards as the most promising. The Army has not kept up with its rivals in this area either: This department was allocated 28.6 billion dollars for research between 1981 and 1986, while the Navy received 52.7 billion dollars and the Air Force received 81 billion. The last figure attests to the significance Washington attaches to the plans for aerospace militarization (see Table 2 [not reproduced]).

Statistics indicate that the Army is the Pentagon's step-child. The Navy is slightly ahead of the Air Force in allocations, but the gap is small and it exists primarily because naval programs begun in previous years are still being financed. Although the Air Force is lagging slightly behind the Navy, it receives more funds for R&D and therefore has a chance to build up an impressive number of long-term projects, which means that it can expect a priority position in the structure of the Defense Department in the future.

Disagreements over the ratio of nuclear to non-nuclear forces have recently grown quite intense. The Reagan administration is being accused of concentrating on the development of U.S. nuclear weapons at the expense of non-nuclear forces. In particular, the previously mentioned Kaufmann said in this connection that the logical conclusion is that the development of the capabilities of conventional armed forces and arms is the top priority in military policy in the nuclear age; after 1945 it became obvious that "non-nuclear forces are not only the sole means of military power that can be used, but are also the forces in which the United States and its allies have the greatest relative superiority."

In the U.S. Armed Forces the priority development of non-nuclear forces is of the greatest interest to the Army, because none of its weapons are included in the strategic nuclear triad. The desire of the Army leadership to expand its arsenal has encouraged this department to seek alternatives. They include, in particular, the air-land operational plan, the development of highly accurate weapons with near-nuclear properties, and the work on chemical and bacteriological weapons. This explains why the Army is promoting the approval of plans for the full-scale production of binary weapons. Chemical weapons are being portrayed as an important alternative to nuclear weapons.

Following the example of the Army, which plans to equip its cannon artillery and rocket artillery with binary ammunition, the Air Force and Navy have submitted their own plans for the creation of a chemical binary arsenal. The Air Force's plans include the production of the "Big Eye" aerial bomb, and the Navy hopes to win approval for the production of the "Wet Eye" bomb.

The armed forces leadership intensified the campaign for the buildup of conventional arms after the INF Treaty had been signed. This applies above all to the Army command, because it is precisely the Army's nuclear weapons that will be eliminated. Army generals have given the agreement their formal approval (especially General J. Galvin, supreme allied commander of NATO forces in Europe), but they are insisting on compensatory measures.

The narrow departmental approach of the commanders of branches of the armed forces to talks on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms is also having an extremely negative impact. Their reluctance to give up their strategic nuclear systems has colored the attitude of the top-level officials of military departments toward the prospect of the elimination of all Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons. It is indicative that the chiefs of staff justify their position (with a view to legislative efforts to reduce the federal budget deficit and limit military spending) by saying that the conclusion of this kind of agreement would cause an inordinate increase in Defense Department expenditures on conventional arms. This was pointed out, in particular, in the January 1987 issue of the ARMED FORCES JOURNAL.

Describing the atmosphere of constant political battles in the U.S. Defense Department, Brig Gen (Ret) E. Lynch wrote in 1986 that the typical situation was one "in which unconfirmed hypotheses are portrayed as confirmed doctrine, in which the degree of danger is adjusted in line with the latest technological achievements, in which scenarios are invented to validate dubious decisions," and so forth.

The competition can entail the use of the most diverse methods. They include the exertion of influence on Congress by means of ordinary lobbying and by more sophisticated means. According to some congressmen, former Secretary of the Navy J. Lehman tried to create a network of naval ports covering the entire coastline of the United States in order to gain political support for his program for the construction of 600 ships. Barry Goldwater, who was the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee at that time, said that the secretary of the Navy "had found an excellent opportunity to keep approximately 14 senators and several members of the House of Representatives eternally in debt to the Navy."

There have been paradoxical cases in which the leadership of branches of the armed forces has tried to secure more profitable contracts by avoiding the performance of tasks high on the administration's list of priorities or

even by openly boycotting them. During hearings in the Senate in 1983, Senator S. Nunn (Democrat, Georgia) told Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger: "You...and even the President have said that these programs (joint Navy and Army programs for the development of a tactical missile system—Yu.K.) are priority projects, but the branches of the armed forces responsible for them have shelved them."

Conflicts in this sphere lead to disagreements over virtually all aspects of U.S. military policy, from new strategic concepts and changes in the structure of the armed forces to the creation of a new command or a new weapons system. The extremely fierce battles over the current administration's most odious program, connected with the militarization of space, are being fought in two spheres.

First of all, there is competition between military departments, each of which has its own space command, agencies, and groups, for the right to play an important role in the development and implementation of SDI and, consequently, to receive a sizable share of budget allocations. This competition is being waged by the Department of the Army's Missile Defense Command, the Air Force Space Command, the Naval Research Laboratory, etc. In 1985 the Unified Aerospace Defense Command of the U.S. Armed Forces was created to unite the efforts of all branches of the armed forces. The command staff was composed in the following manner: approximately 50 percent representing the Air Force, around 30 percent representing the Navy and Marine Corps, and 20 percent representing the Army. Air Force General R. Herres was appointed to head the command (he was replaced by General J. Piotrowski from the same department), and Vice Admiral W. Ramsey was appointed his deputy. The alignment of forces in the Aerospace Command reflects priorities in military space research. As for strategic research in the sphere of ballistic missile defense, the largest share of allocations in 1986 went to the Army, which is developing the land-based component of the system.

The second area of conflict is connected with the presence of people in the United States, including people in the armed forces, who oppose the administration's plans to militarize space. The military are disturbed by the tendency of the colossal expenditures on space programs to limit the scales of work on other weapons systems. This is the opinion of Pentagon Comptroller R. Helm. He announced, in particular, that because of SDI, "we will have fewer bullets and weapons and a lower level of combat readiness."

Conflicts in the military sphere are influencing the internal political climate in the country and the international situation. In domestic politics they lead to the duplication of the efforts of departments to create new military systems;¹ cause the leaders of different branches of the armed forces to evade the allocation of funds for

programs benefiting other departments; force the command personnel of different branches of the armed forces to oppose the adoption of concepts not guaranteeing them a worthy position within the conceptual framework; encourage the heads of military departments to boycott inconvenient decisions by the President and secretary of defense, etc. All of this reduces the effectiveness of Defense Department activity, leads to financial overexpenditures, and complicates the elaboration and implementation of a single set of politico-military priorities. This situation forces administration and congressional officials to criticize the principles of the Pentagon organizational structure, which, in the opinion of former Senator B. Goldwater, is "flawed and needs to be revised."

When we examine the conflicts in the Pentagon and the competition between U.S. military departments from the standpoint of international security, we should single out two aspects.

First of all, all contemporary U.S. strategic concepts are aimed at gaining the ability to use the armed forces and accumulated arms more effectively for the attainment of military advantages and the achievement of political goals on this basis. During this process the politico-military leadership has to take the alignment of forces in the overall structure of U.S. armed forces and the position of the heads of all military departments into consideration. In connection with this, the strategic concept becomes a unique compromise, designed for the maximum satisfaction of the interests of all competing departments striving for priority in the performance of national security functions. Because there is always a department dissatisfied with the place it has been assigned (and the level of its financial allocations) within the framework of a specific strategy, this motivates the leadership of this branch of the armed forces to seek alternative concepts, and this undermines current strategy. The strategy of "direct confrontation" Reagan announced is a vivid example. A dramatic increase in allocations for all branches of the armed forces was planned within the framework of this strategy. Nevertheless, the struggle for the largest share of financial allocations throughout the 1980's was waged by two departments—Air Force and Navy. In an attempt to change this situation, the Army leadership promoted an entire group of measures—from the full-scale modernization of the Army, with a view to scientific and technical achievements, to a stronger emphasis on conventional arms and armed forces in national security policy.

The second aspect is that the conflicts are complicating the adoption of new politico-military concepts because this results in a change in priorities and cuts in allocations for the military departments occupying the central position in earlier concepts. The Kennedy administration's strategy of "flexible response" and the opposition to it by the heads of the Air Force, especially the Strategic Air Command, can serve as a vivid example.

The conflicts in the Pentagon have negative effects on Soviet-American relations and on the international situation as a whole. There are several reasons for this.

In the hope of surpassing competing departments and receiving maximum budget allocations, the different branches of the armed forces are constantly conducting research projects for the development of qualitatively new weapons.

When military departments want an increase in the funds allocated for arms procurement, they use the worst-case scenario to assess the adversary. In particular, they juggle intelligence data. These assessments by the heads of different branches of the armed forces lead to misperceptions of the Soviet Union in the United States and create an atmosphere of suspicion and tension in relations.

All branches of the armed forces are resisting the conclusion of arms limitation and reduction agreements. When circumstances dictate the need to consent to agreements in this sphere, the heads of the military departments strive to reserve their services' right to develop new advanced weapons systems in exchange for the approval of negotiated agreements. The position the Naval and Air Force commanders took on the Salt-I Interim Agreement is an indicative example. The Navy made its approval of the agreement conditional upon the administration's promise to support the Trident submarine program. The Air Force Command won approval for its plan to step up the development of the strategic B-1 bomber in exchange for its support of the agreement.

Under the conditions of existing agreements, competition stimulates an arms race in the areas not covered by these agreements. After the interim agreement was concluded, for example, the different armed services intensified the completion and perfection of their own types of cruise missiles. The Pentagon leadership's current position on the INF Treaty could lead to a similar situation.

Striving for priority, the competing branches of the armed forces try to seize the initiative from one another. The struggle for primacy in the development of the most sophisticated and advanced weapons systems and the competition between military departments are therefore simultaneously the cause and the effect of arms race escalation. For example, the Air Force developed the MIRV to break through the ABM system the U.S. Army was developing. Later, Army designers began work on an improved ABM system to deal effectively with MIRVed missiles. The results of competition are a continuous search for new designs and the development of increasingly sophisticated systems. Furthermore, the arms race is stimulated not by external factors, but by internal ones—the efforts of military departments to build better and more effective weapons systems.

The arms race, which came into being deep within the U.S. Defense Department, was forced on the USSR and later acquired its own "insane momentum." The fact that the Soviet Union allowed itself to become involved in the arms race was used by reactionary groups in the United States to create a tense atmosphere, to discredit our country in the international arena, and to impede its socioeconomic development. If the arms race is of an internal nature and is nurtured by the competition between military departments, does this mean that the inherent contradictions of the Defense Department make the arms race inevitable? No, it does not mean this. First of all, the nutritive medium for it is the atmosphere of suspicion and fear of the other side, which allows military departments to constantly promote new weapons and solicit new allocations. In the second place, after being engendered within the military departments, the arms race is setting other mechanisms in motion, is moving to a higher, international level, and is beginning to develop according to its own laws.

The realization that the arms race was originally caused by internal factors should serve as the basis for measures to prevent the development of the process in its initial stages. These measures, founded on the new political thinking, include the conclusion of broad and verifiable agreements, the reinforcement of comprehensive confidence-building measures, and the development of broad contacts in the politico-military sphere, which would impede the use of the enemy image to justify an arms buildup. Finally, another measure is the principle of the new approach to defense, announced at the 19th party conference—"the effectiveness of defense should be secured from now on primarily by qualitative parameters in the case of technical equipment, military science, and the composition of armed forces."

Footnotes

1. Therefore, the fact that all three branches of the armed forces have intensified their work on programs for the improvement of the command, control, communication and intelligence system (C³I), although it did stimulate research and development, led to a situation in which allocations for these programs almost doubled in the last 5 years: from 12.3 billion dollars in FY 1982 to 24.4 billion in FY 1987, with a corresponding rise from 3.9 billion to 8 billion dollars in the sphere of strategic C³I systems.

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Book Briefs

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[Reports by V.N. Baryakin (Zaporozhye) on books "Vzglyad v istoriyu- vzglyad v budushcheye: russkiye i sovetskiye pisateli, uchenyye, deyateli kultury o SShA" [View of the Past—View of the Future: The United States as Seen by Russian and Soviet Writers, Scholars, and Cultural Figures], compiled by A.N. Nikolyukin, Moscow, Progress, 1987, 720 pages; and "Proryv. Breakthrough. Stanovleniye novogo myshleniya. Sovetskiye i

zapadnyye uchenyye prizyvayut k miru bez voyn" [Breakthrough. The Establishment of the New Thinking. Soviet and Western Scholars Appeal for a World Without War], edited by Anat. Gromyko, M. Hellman et al, Moscow, Progress, 1988, 368 pages; and by A.M. Belov and A.I. Deykin on book "Platezhnyye otnosheniya—skrytyy uzel mezhimperialisticheskikh protivorechiy" [Payment Correlations—Hidden Knot of Inter-Imperialist Conflicts] by M.A. Portnoy, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1987, 264 pages]

[Text]

View of the Past—View of the Future; Breakthrough

The Progress Publishing House has published two books of unique content and political, ideological, and academic import. The first is an anthology of essays, articles, and memoirs, consisting of two sections. The first, covering the period from 1530 to 1917, contains mainly descriptions of what Russians saw and experienced when they visited America, this country which was so far and yet so near. There are also thoughts on American politics and culture expressed by prominent Russians—Maksim Grek, M.V. Lomonosov, D.I. Fonvizin, A.S. Pushkin, M.S. Lunin, F.M. Dostoyevskiy, A.I. Gertsen, V.G. Korolenko, M. Gorkiy, and others. The second section covers the period from 1917 to 1987. This part of the book is more reflective, and contains more doubts but also more hopeful statements about the establishment of friendly relations with the United States. These include opinions expressed by V.I. Lenin, I.P. Pavlov, K.S. Stanislavskiy, N.I. Vavilov, M.A. Sholokhov, I.G. Erenburg, and the writers and scholars of our own day who have much to say about the United States—V. Korotich, E. Mezheylaytis, G. Borovik, and others.

The book "Breakthrough" is also an anthology. Here prominent Soviet, American, and West European scholars and writers—S. Kapitsa, M. Hellman, R. Roney, A. Adamovich, K. Boulding, A. Melvil, N. Bekhtereva, S. Call, E. Rogers, and F. Burlatsky (33 authors in all)—discuss the idea of global peace in the nuclear age from different vantage points and suggest what might be done so that present political and military tendencies do not lead to nuclear war. This book is simultaneously a warning and an appeal for sound dialogue between two great powers with a common goal—the survival of humanity.

What the two books have in common is that their authors, regardless of their occupations, of whether they are believers or atheists, and of which social values they cherish, acknowledge the significance of the United States and the USSR in world culture and the role of these states in the history of the world community. The wisdom of our time consists in not letting all of our disagreements obscure our common goal—the establishment of a world without wars.

Dedicating the book "Breakthrough" to their children and grandchildren, the authors acknowledge that statements about the principles of the elimination of war are not enough. They believe that the survival of civilization will necessitate an end to power politics.

Payment Correlations

Patterns of reciprocal payments unite the national economies in the monetary sphere of capitalism, and this is why they represent a hidden knot of inter-imperialist conflicts. The appearance of the huge deficit in the U.S. balance of payments and of the positive balance of Japan and the FRG in the 1980's attests to shifts in the balance of power among them and to the intensification of their struggle for leadership.

The present state of such important elements of the balance of payments as trade relations, the movement of capital, and the international exchange of services is discussed in detail in the book. This book by M.A. Portnoy is one of the most profound works on world economics and analyzed the present state of the most important element of international capitalist economic relations on a high theoretical level.

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Chronicle of U.S.-Soviet Relations July-September 1988

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[Text]

July

4—The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium sent President Ronald Reagan of the United States its greetings on the national holiday of the United States—Independence Day.

A TASS statement was published in connection with the destruction of the Iranian passenger plane by a missile from the American naval ship "Vincennes." The statement said, in part: "This tragedy proves once again that the American Navy should leave the Persian Gulf immediately. There is every chance that peace and security in the gulf could be secured on a qualitatively different basis—by UN naval forces."

6-12—Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and first deputy minister of defense, visited the United States as the guest of Admiral W. Crowe, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. He met and spoke with President Reagan and other American officials. Akhromeyev and Crowe signed a plan for contacts between USSR and

U.S. armed forces in 1988-1990, envisaging an exchange of visits by the military leaders of the two countries, military delegations, and ships.

8—The United States conducted an underground nuclear test on the test site in Nevada. The yield of the blast, codenamed "Alamo," was under 150 kilotons.

9—Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze received U.S. Ambassador J. Matlock at his request. Their frank talk included a discussion of the state of affairs in several parts of the world.

11—When General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev addressed the Polish Sejm during his official visit to Poland, he proposed that forward-based Soviet aircraft in Eastern Europe be withdrawn in exchange for NATO's agreement not to deploy 72 of its F-16 fighter bombers in Italy now that they have been refused by Spain.

12—The 10th round of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms began in Geneva with a plenary meeting.

14-15—Representatives of the USSR Academy of Sciences and NASA (United States) met in Moscow and agreed to exchange research findings connected with advanced projects in the study of the solar system.

15—The first meeting of the special verification commission established in accordance with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles came to an end in Geneva. During the meeting important advances were made in the planning of measures to promote the effective implementation of treaty provisions.

A delegation of Soviet inspectors arrived in the United States to monitor the elimination of nuclear missiles in accordance with the INF Treaty.

15-16—A statement approved at a conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Commission proposes the reduction of Warsaw Pact and NATO armed forces and arms in three phases, to give the armed forces of both sides a strictly defensive nature, with the appropriate verification measures.

18—A group of U.S. senators in Moscow spoke with officials in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and the State Foreign Economic Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers.

19—E.A. Shevardnadze received U.S. Ambassador J. Matlock, who gave him a personal message from U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz. The main topic of their subsequent conversation was the possibility of a solution to the Kampuchean question. They also discussed the Iran-Iraq conflict.

20—A group of 20 Soviet inspectors arrived on the American Air Force base in Greenham Common in line with the provisions for the verification of the observance of the INF Treaty.

21—Secretary A.F. Dobrynin of the CPSU Central Committee received Rear Admiral (Ret) G. LaRocque, director of the Center for Defense Information. LaRocque gave him the center's honorary medal, to be passed on to M.S. Gorbachev as a sign of appreciation for his important contribution to the relaxation of international tension and the prevention of nuclear war.

The United States expressed a wish to inspect the former Soviet missile base in the CSSR near Granica.

26—A group of Soviet inspectors arrived at Travis Air Force Base to verify the observance of INF Treaty provisions.

28—The ninth round of Soviet-American consultations on a chemical weapons ban came to an end in Geneva.

30—The USSR delegation at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva put forth new initiatives aimed at the quickest possible drafting of a treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons by 50 percent with strict observance of the ABM Treaty.

August

1-4—Secretary of Defense F. Carlucci visited the Soviet Union. He had meetings with Candidate Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov, Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium A.A. Gromyko, and other officials. In Carlucci's words, the results of his dialogue with D.T. Yazov exceeded his expectations.

2—E.A. Shevardnadze received A. Newhart, chairman of the board of the Gannett Company, an American publishing concern; J. Quinn, editor in chief of USA TODAY; and D. Mazzarellu, president of the paper's international news service. Newhart was also received by A.F. Dobrynin.

3—The last session prior to adjournment of Warsaw Pact-NATO consultations on the drafting of a mandate for talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals was held in Vienna. Agreements on the composition of

negotiating parties and on the binding international nature of future accords were recorded. Agreements were also reached on virtually all organizational matters and negotiation procedures.

4—At a meeting with representatives of the American embassy in the Consular Administration of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, American citizen G. Sauter repeated that his decision to seek political asylum in the USSR was made consciously and voluntarily.

5-15—The second Soviet-American peace cruise took place on the Mississippi.

8—E.A. Shevardnadze received U.S. Ambassador J. Matlock, who gave him a personal message from U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz.

11—A published statement by a USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman said: "Under the cover of talk about the USSR's non-observance of treaty obligations, the United States is installing large radar stations inside and outside its own territory with parameters virtually indistinguishable from the parameters of ABM radar stations. These stations could be used to defend U.S. territory against missiles.... The Soviet Union firmly declares its adherence to the ABM Treaty and has invariably supported the precise and unconditional observance of treaty obligations and the retention and reinforcement of treaty regulations."

15—In a published statement the Soviet Government expressed the hope that the United States, as one of the guarantors of the Geneva accords on Afghanistan, would not remain indifferent to Pakistan's violation of the Geneva accords and would exercise the proper influence in this matter.

17—A joint Soviet-American experiment was conducted on the test site in Nevada to verify the force of an underground nuclear explosion. This was the first time the test site had been visited by an official Soviet delegation, which was made up of 45 scientists, diplomats, and military experts.

23—A group of Soviet inspectors arrived at Travis Air Force Base. In accordance with the INF Treaty, they will conduct another inspection of several U.S. military installations to verify the fulfillment of treaty provisions.

Most Americans are in favor of broader cooperation with the Soviet Union. This was revealed by a public opinion poll conducted by the Daniel Yankelovich Group, Inc. Around 76 percent of the respondents expressed support for "moves toward rapprochement" with the USSR.

The Soviet-American peace march from Odessa to Kiev began.

24—Representatives of the USSR and the United States met in Geneva to discuss the force of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty.

27—The USSR began the elimination of intermediate-range missiles envisaged in the INF Treaty. Three solid-propellant mobile RSD-10 (SS-20) missiles were blown up on the Kapustin Yar test site in Astrakhan Oblast.

29—The third round of Soviet-American full-scale talks on the limitation and eventual cessation of nuclear tests began in Geneva with a meeting of the delegation heads.

Meetings and discussions continued in both groups—on strategic offensive arms and on space—at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons. There are still significant differences in the approaches of the two sides to space issues. The USSR delegation submitted new compromise proposals for agreement on the provisions of the protocol to the future agreement on the observance of the ABM Treaty and non-withdrawal from it for a specific period of time. In the group on strategic offensive weapons the American side proposed the rewording of some statements regarding the limitation of air-launched long-range cruise missiles for the implementation of the Moscow accords. The Soviet delegation submitted several proposals providing chances for progress in the drafting of the protocol on the re-equipment and elimination required for the attainment and maintenance of dramatically lowered total quantitative levels of strategic offensive arms.

The USSR delegation also submitted two major compromise proposals on the draft protocol on inspections.

31-2 September—Soviet-American consultations on conflicts in various parts of the world were held in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

September

2—PRAVDA published a statement by the USSR delegation on the results of the USSR-U.S. talks in Geneva from 24 through 31 August and on the discussion of the force of the ABM Treaty after the next 5 years it is in force.

5—An article by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev in PRAVDA, "The Navy and Common Security," cited comparative data on the ships of the Soviet and U.S. navies.

9-10—The seventh session of the Soviet-American joint commission on cooperation in housing and other construction was held in Washington. The results of coordinated projects, more precise job specifications, and the exchange of delegations in coming years were discussed at the session.

10—M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan were officially declared the winners of the prize of the American World Without War organization for 1988, which is awarded each year to politicians and public spokesmen who make the greatest contribution to peace and the elimination of the danger of war.

12—A.F. Dobrynin received A. Hammer.

18—During his stay in Krasnoyarsk, M.S. Gorbachev put forth new peace initiatives to strengthen peace and trust in the Asian-Pacific zone. A program consisting of seven points specifically envisages the repudiation of installations in Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay and in the Philippines by the USSR and the United States on a "symmetrical basis."

19—The fourth meeting of representatives of the Soviet and American public began in Tbilisi. M.S. Gorbachev sent a message of greetings to the meeting, specifically stating that the USSR is in favor of continuing the dialogue between the USSR and the United States.

22-23—E.A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz conducted talks in Washington. While the USSR minister of foreign affairs was in the United States, he was received by R. Reagan and gave him a personal message from M.S. Gorbachev. The entire range of questions connected with Soviet-American relations was discussed during the talks.

24—Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee A.N. Yakovlev received Director C. Wick of the U.S. Information Agency. They discussed the state of present and future Soviet-American exchanges in information, publishing, culture, and art.

Soviet-American consultations on the proliferation of missile technology were held in Washington.

26-28—Soviet-American talks on information exchange were held in Moscow. This was the second such meeting by representatives of the USSR and the United States.

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